LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT AND THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that.is not resolved, sooner
or later, into a judicial question.
-De Tocqueville, Democracy in America
ROBERT

G. DIXON,

JR.*

The Tennessee state legislature reapportionment case, Baker v. Carr,1 is a Janusfaced decision. It stands at the end of a long line of judicial refusals to enter the
political thicket of reapportionment, so well and so eloquently summarized by Justice
Frankfurter in his dissent. As such it evokes memories of lost battles of the past.
But the ruling that courts now may entertain challenges to the unrepresentative
character of legislatures under the equal protection of the laws clause of the fourteenth
amendment seems also to inaugurate a new era for American politics and constitutionalism. Legislative institutions, political theories of representative government,
and the unique institution of judicial review will be profoundly affected.
For some the decision in favor of justiciability is a new statue of liberty, signalling
a new majoritarianism which will yield new statutory foundations for fresh ap-

proaches to urbanism, metropolitanism, and regionalism, for civil rights and liberties,
for welfare statism, and even for international relations. For some the decision
sounds the death knell on a rule of rural virtue rooted in the mystique of the settler

tradition, the log cabin, and the family farm. Others, perhaps more realistic, suggest
that the decision has been over-sold despite the immediate flurry of activity it caused

in Maryland,2 Georgia,' Alabama,' and a number of other statesY They point to
institutional obstacles to achieving a flat majoritarianism even with the decision.6
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' Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 228 Md. 4r2, x8o A.2d 656 (1962).

Impelled by this decision the

legislature, in special session, reapportioned the lower house. Washington Post, June x, 1962, p. x,
col. 8, p. 9, col. i. See text infra at notes 274 et seq.
'Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. x962), appeal docketed, No. 959, 370 U.S. 921
(1962); county unit system invalidated "in its present form" by federal district court. Other suits
challenged state legislative apportionment and congressional districts; see notes 267, 269 injfra.
'Sims v. Frink, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 2512 (M.D. Ala.) (U.S. April 14, x962); federal district court said
that failure of Alabama to reapportion state legislature by July 16 would require court to do so itself;
see text infra at notes 254 et seq.
'Within a month and one-half after the Supreme Court decided Baker v. Carr, court action had been
taken or was pending in twenty-two states and was being planned in a number of other states. N.Y.
Times, May 14, 1962, p. i, col. 2. See text infra at notes 287 et seq.
'in regard to state legislatures, a simple majoritarianism is rendered virtually impossible by such
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They note the prospect of ping-pong litigation with the case bouncing back and
forth until the legislature finally makes a tinker the courts will accept, which seemed
to be in prospect for Maryland until the governor intervened More fundamentally,
they cite empirical studies showing that rural bloc voting obstacles to urban progress
in current legislatures may have been exaggerated.'
It is, however, no exaggeration to say that in terms of involvement of the judiciary
in the politics of the people, and in the great questions of democratic institutional
arrangements, the decision is second only to Marbury v. Madison.' There the Court
first clearly sanctified the American tradition of judicial articulation and enforceability of constitutional principles. It is a more pregnant decision than Brown v.
Board of Education1 ° regarding school desegregation for it involves, as do the
social contract philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, basic choices regarding
conditions of political allegiance and expression of public will and opinion. It brings
to the surface, as Justice Harlan noted in dissent, unresolved conflicts of principle
underlying our expedient arrangements of election districts and legislative assemblies;I'
common state constitutional requirements (not challenged in Baker v. Carr) as minimum and maximum limits, regardless of population; an apportionment of representatives to counties or other units;
ceilings on the size of the legislature; traditional use of fixed local units as bases for apportionment; inadequacies in reapportionment machinery. These state constitutional standards will be subservient, of
course, to any federal constitutional standards of fair representation.
See Charts I and III in Appendix, regarding bases of representation specified in state constitutions.
Regarding built-in inequities, see Durfee, Apportionment of Representation in the Legislature: A Study of
State Constitutions, 43 MICH. L. REv. ogi at 1091-95 (1945). See also GORDoN E. BAKER, STATE
CONSTITUTIONS: REAPPORTIONMENT 5-14 (ig6o); Jewell, Constitutional Provisions for State Legislative
Apportionment, 8 W. PouT. Q. 272 (1955); Dauer & Kelsy, Unrepresentative States, 44 NAT. MurNc.
REv. 571-75 (1955); Merry, Minority Rule: Challenge to Democracy, Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 2,
1958, § 2, p. 13.
'In what the Washington Post called the "first open display of executive anger at the Legislature
during his four years in office," Governor Tawes in the closing hours of the constitutionally limited
special session sent a sharp message. It produced a stop-gap bill adding additional seats which for the
first time gave the seventy-seven per cent of the population in urban areas a majority (fifty-five per cent)
of the seats in the lower house. Until the message, legislators from Southern Maryland and the Eastern
Shore, with an odd persistence bred from generations of comfortable overrepresentation, were laboring
to bring forth a bill which could have worsened the urban position in the long run. The question of
reapportionment for the Maryland Senate is being litigated. Washington Post, June 1, 1962, p. 1, col.
8, p. 9, col. I.
8
Wheeler & Bebout, After Reapportionment, 5z NAT. Civic REv. (formerly NAT. MuNIc. REV.) 246,
247-48 (1962), citing Derge, Metropolitan and Outside Alignments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative
Delegations, 52 AM. POL. Se. REv. io65 (i958); Young, The Z958 Special Session of the Missouri
General Assembly, Missoums POLITICA. SCIENCE ASSOCIATION NEwsLE'r'r= No. 3 (1958).
Even the Maryland legislature's emasculation-by-amendment (prior to Governor Tawes' sharp rebuke,
supra note 7) of the court-impelled reapportionment bills may not have been due wholly to the unreconstructed Southern Maryland and Eastern Shore delegates. Urban delegates split and quarrelled,
causing the Washington Post (May 30, x962, p. 16, col. I) to comment, with characteristic bluntness, that
"the suburb's underrepresentation is not entirely a matter of numbers."
Years ago a long-time student of legislatures observed that "what class feeling appears in the State
Legislature is chiefly agrarian." ROBERT LucE, LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES 368 (930).
He also observed
that urban delegations sometimes split on party lines, and that parochialism varied inversely with city size.
Ibid.
95 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (I8O3).
0 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
" "In the last analysis, what lies at the core of this controversy is a difference of opinion as to the
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Baker v. Carr calls for a fresh look at bicameralism; the single-member district
system; population versus area as bases for representation; traditions of thought and
political action geared to counties as historic representative units; the problem of the
political artificiality of mathematically equal and frequently changing districts;
voting qualifications; the extent to which the one-man-one-vote principle should be
universalized in domestic political institutions as distinct from international political
institutions; the area, population, and institutional bases of political parties. The
list could be extended easily by each social scientist in the context of his own discipline. 2
In making this fresh look it will be important to have a firm grip on Baker v.
Carr itself, the malapportionment problem that called it into being, its impact on the
line of precedent cases, the crucial and unresolved question of the constitutional
standard of fair representation, and judicial means for implementing a standard. It
is to these issues, with an occasional look at the peripheral questions, that this
article is devoted.

THE JUDICIAL SETTING:
"POLTICAL QuESTIONs" AND JUsTICIABILITY

The "political question" doctrine is one of the most tantalizing of all American
constitutional law principles, and by nature indefinable because it is really not a
"principle" at all. Its elusiveness proceeds from the fact that it is more a rule of
expediency than a rule of reason. 3 It is designed to cover areas where judicial
function of representative government. It is surely beyond argument that those who have the responsibility for devising a system of representation may permissibly consider that factors other than bare
numbers should be taken into account. The existence of the United States Senate is proof enough of that.
To consider that we may ignore the Tennessee legislature's judgment in this instance because that body
was the product of an asymmetrical electoral apportionment would in effect be to assume the very
conclusion here disputed. Hence we must accept the present form of the Tennessee legislature as the
embodiment of the state's choice, or, made realistically, its compromise, between competing political
philosophies." Justice Harlan dissenting, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, at 333 (1962).
" Regarding state legislatures and theories of representation, see ALFx.
DE GRAziA, PUBLIC AND
REPUBLIo (1951); JEFFERSON B. FoEDHAm, THE STATE LEGISLAiVE INsTnTUTION (0959); ROBERT LUCE,
LEISLATIVa PRINCIPLES (1930); AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE Ass'N, AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATURES
(Zeller ed. 1954).
iS CHARLES G. POST, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS (936);
Field, The Doctrine of

PoliticalQuestions in the Federal Courts, 8 MsNN. L. REV. 485 (1924); Finkelstein, Judicial Sell-Limitation,
37 HAuv. L. REv. 338 (1924); Weston, Political Questions, 38 HART. L. REv. 296 (1925). Finkelstein,
supra at 344, says that the category of "political questions" applies "to all those matters of which the
court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction."

Field, supra at 485-86, cautions that "such utility as the study [of political questions) may have will
consist, however, in the classification of cases, because conclusions and explanations are often colored
to some extent by the viewpoints of the student." Also see Finkelstein, Further Notes on Judicial SelfLimitation, 39 HARv. L. REV. 221 (1925).
More recent comment reveals little change except a tendency to expand the concept. Frank and
panelists, Political Questions, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAw 36-47 (Cahn ed. 1954). Also see
ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW 151-72 (1952); HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 192-97, 207 (953); ROBERT H. JAcKsoN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 53-62 (1955).
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reason fails for lack of guiding standards, 14 or judicial power is undermined by
prospective inability to shape or enforce a remedy.', It is a self-imposed limitation
yielding judicial disengagement either from a given issue or an entire case.

To the cynical, aided by the Court's inability to articulate clearly the metes and
bounds of the doctrine, and imbued with the American tendency to wrap judges in
the robes of philosopher-kings, the political question doctrine appears as an abdication of responsibility. Others, mindful of the infrequent use of the doctrine, view it
as a natural corollary of a system of judicial review. For the practice of an enforceable constitution periodically puts vox populi and higher law in apparent opposition,
with the judiciary as uneasy mediator.
Unlike Gertrude Stein's roses, "political questions" are almost infinitely varied.
One of the most active categories has been the general disposition to reject suits
questioning the apportionment of seats in multi-membered legislative assemblies,
the drawing of election district lines, and weighting of votes under electoral college
or unit vote plans. Even within this category the judicial precedents cannot be
treated meaningfully as a common mass. Many discussions by judges, commentators,
and briefwriters suffer from failure to separate state court action from federal court
action, state law bases for complaint from federal law bases, and state legislative cases
from congressional district cases. Faulty generalizations result, and true precedents
are not distinguished from pseudo-precedents.
A. State Court Action
Filing of a case in a state court rather than a federal court affects the question

of justiciability because many state courts do not follow the federal principle of
separation of powers and do things which would be clearly outside the "judicial
function" under article three of the Federal Constitution." Being unbound by the
federal separation of powers principle, state judiciaries can ignore or stretch the
parallel principle in their state constitutions. Some state judiciaries do not shrink
from acting in areas where there is no principle of right, but only a bare policy
choice of the sort that could and should be made by normal political and legislative
processes. A notable example is the Virginia judiciary's municipal annexation
activity. In the guise of court "cases" judges order annexation of land to cities,
"4Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453 (939); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1867,
x868). A comment by Justice Jackson, although written in the context of judicial discretion in declaratory
judgment proceedings, is likewise relevant here: "But when all of the axioms have been exhausted and
all words of definition have been spent, the propriety of declaratory relief in a particular case will depend
upon a circumspect sense of fitness informed by the teachings and experience concerning the functions
and extent of federal judicial power." Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 243
(1952). Declaratory judgment cases are among the leading ones exploring the concept of justiciability
in situations where jurisdiction and standing are conceded.
15 Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 500-01 (1867).
18
ROBERT J. HARIus, Tan JUDICI. PowERt OF Tm UNtraD STATES (1940); ARTHUR T. VANDMaI.ILT,
THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE (1953); Dixon, The
Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Federal Immunity Statutes, 23 GEo. WASH. L. Rrv. 501, 509-32,
627-40 (1955).
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determine boundaries, and specify conditions.' 7 This "Virginia plan" is much
admired by devotees of forcible annexation, and has counterparts in some other
states. In many states, however, where the interpretation of the separation of powers
principle conforms more closely to the federal interpretation, such unstandardized
delegation of policy making to the courts would be unconstitutional.' 8 In the light
of this too little recognized facet of state constitutional law, some state court cases
on apportionment and districting may not be relevant precedents for justiciability

under federal precepts.' 9
There has been much loose citation of precedents even within state judicial
systems. For example, the highest courts of New Jersey and Maryland confidently
asserted recently that "in 1938, the courts of twenty-two states had exercised the
power, or had stated that they had the power, to review legislative apportionment
acts upon constitutional grounds. ... ,"' The statement is taken from Jones v.
Freeman,' an Oklahoma case in 1943 in which the court actually held that the
separation of powers doctrine barred affirmative relief against the legislature for malapportionment. The Oklahoma Supreme Court had in turn cited the quoted statement to a 1938 article which in turn cited no authorities whatsoever.22
"Henrico

County v. City of Richmond, xo6 Va. 282, 55 S.E. 683 (19o6).

For discussion see

ROBERT G. DixoN, JR. & JOHN R. KERSTET-TER, ADJUSTING MUNIcI,.A. Bos NMxas: THE LAW AND PccE
IN 48 STATES 307-08 (x959); Bain, Annexation: Virginia's Not-So-Judicial System, 15 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
251 (955).
8
See DixoN & KERSTETTER, op. cit. supra note 17, for comments on judicial discretion in the following states: Ark. 54; Idaho 96; Ill. 1o2; Ind. 114; Kan. 126; Ky. 134; La. 143; Mich. 159; Minn. x75; Miss.
1S; Mo. x86; Mont. 193; Nebr. 197; Nev. 2o5; N.Y. 219; N.C. 226; Okla. 242; Ore. 248; Pa.
258; S.C. 27z; S.D. 276; Tenn. 281; Tex. 291; Utah 299; Va. 307; W. Va. 326, Wyo. 339-

" Federal justiciability precepts bind the Supreme Court even in cases brought up from state judiciaries
with different perceptions of the judicial function. Nashville, C. and St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249
(1933); Chicago and G. T. Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892).
"°Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. I, X3-14, 16x A.2d 705, 711 (I96O); Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 431-432, xSo A.2d 656, 666 (x962). The statement is cited also in Appellants' Brief in the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, p. 38.
X93 Okla. 554, 56o, 146 P.2d 564, 570 (1943). The court denied the request for a mandamus to
require the next election to be held under the apportionment as made by the state constitution, and
for an order to restrain payment of compensation to legislators already elected under allegedly invalid
laws.
The opinion also contained this dictum, somewhat misleading if taken out of context (e.g., Lewis,
Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1o69 n.7o (1958)): "But,
though it may be conceded that we have the power to declare all apportionment statutes enacted since
statehood void and to require the next election to be held under the apportionment made by the [state]
Constitution, it does not follow that we should do so. The result of such action would be to increase the
inequality of representation already existing." 146 P.2d 564, 572. Also see Justice O'Neal's comment,
dissenting in Romang v. Cordell, 243 P.2d 677 (Okla. 1952).
"Walter, Reapportionment and Urban Representation, 195 Annals xi-=2 (1938). Authorities are
given in Walter's subsequent article, Reapportionment of State Legislative Districts, 37 ILL. L. Ray. 2o,
23 (1942), but some are subject to the caveats indicated below. Also see Annot., 2 A.L.R. x337 (x916).
Since justiciability is seldom mentioned in the state cases, the frequent result of denial of relief may
be due really to an unspoken premise about justiciability rather than to a free adjudication of the merits.
E.g., People ex rel. Hefferman v. Carlock, 198 Ill. 15o , 65 N.E. io9 (1902); Prouty v. Stover, xx Kan.
235 (1873).
Inadequacy of remedy also looms large even in those state cases which purport to make
an adjudication. Brophy v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. x24, 113 N.E.
1040 (x916); State ex rel. Sullivan v. Schnitger, 16 Wyo. 479, 95 P. 698 (19o8); State ex rel. Winnie v.
Stoddard, 25 Nev. 452, 62 Pac. 237 (9oo);

Festler v. Brayton, 145 Ind. 71, 44 N.E. 37 (1896).
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This same source, however, also contained the statement that no successful cases
of judicial control of legislative inaction were found because the separation of powers
doctrine prevented courts from interfering "to force the legislature to perform a
legislative duty, even if that performance is required by the constitution."2 Among
the numerous examples available are the series of unsuccessful cases filed in Illinois
state and federal courts by John B. Fergus and others in the i92o's and I93O'S seeking

directly or indirectly to compel action by the malapportioned Illinois legislature.
Unsuccessful strategies included petitions to mandamus the legislature,2 4 to restrain
payment of salaries to legislators,25 to institute quo warranto proceedings against
legislators,2" to bar the governor from certifying congressional elections 2 7 to avoid
federal taxes pending federal enforcement of the "republican form of government"
guarantee against Illinois,28 and to invalidate laws passed by the malapportioned
legislature. 9 Other examples include the Jones v. Freeman case itself,30 and even
the series of Suffolk County cases in i916 which commonly are cited for the proposition that state courts can and have intervened regarding legislative districting 3 '
The Suffolk County cases illustrate the point that courts do not reapportion even
when they decide that an existing act is illegal. They must usually revert to a prior
act,32 which is like Lenin's "one step forward, two steps back," 33 or rely on further
action by the legislative body. In Suffolk County there was an invalidation of
districts, a mandamus to the county apportionment commissioners, begrudging legislative response from them, a second invalidation and mandamus, a second begrudging
legislative response, at which point the Massachusetts court gave up. Population disparity had been reduced from a spread of 1,957 to 6,182 per representative, to a spread
Of 2,427 to 4,282. The court said: "With some hesitation we are brought to the
conclusion that the inequalities of voting power between the several districts ... are
not quite so great and the means for avoiding them are not quite so clear as to leave
3

Walter, supra note 22, at 13.
2 Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill 510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926); Annot., 46 A.L.R. 964 (1927).
°Fergus v. Kinney, 333 Ill.437, 164 N.E. 665 (1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 854 (1929).
"People ex rel. Fergus v. Blackwell, 342 Ill. 223, 273 NYE. 750 (1930).
"Keogh
"Keogh

v. Homer, 8 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Ill. 1934).
v. Neely, 50 F.2d 685 ( 7 th Cir. 1932).

" People v. Clardy, 334 Ill. 16o, x65 N.E. 638 (1929). Unsuccessful strategies in other states include
action against secretary of state to bar use of challenged districts, State ex rel. Morton v. Zimmerman,
249 Wis. 201, 23 N.W.2d 61o (2946); and requests for judicial orders increasing representation in populous areas or reducing it in less populous areas. Waid v. Pool, 255 Ala. 441, 52 So.2d 869 (2951);
Burns v. Flynn, 155 Misc. 742, 282 N.Y. Supp. 494 (Sup. Ct. 1935), afl'd mere., 245 App. Div. 799, 282
N.Y. Supp. 497 ( 3 d Dep't 1935), afl'd mem., 268 N.Y. 6oi, 298 N.E. 424 (1935); Romang v. Cordell, 200

Okla. 369, 243 P.2d 677 (1952); Latting v. Cordell, 197 Okla. 369, 272, P.2d 397 (1946).
"0See discussion supra note 22.
"Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 224 Mass. 598, 213 N.E. 581
(i926); Donovan v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 55, 113 N.E. 740 (2926);
Brophy v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 224, 113 N.E. 2040 (1926).
2
248, 279 N.E. 526 (2932); Williams v. Secretary of State, 145 Mich.
Moran v. Bowley, 347 Ill.
Schnitger,
447, 1O8 N.W. 749 (29o6); contra, Jones v. Freeman, supra note 22 (dictum); State ex rel.
16 Wyo. 479, 95 Pac. 698 (29o8); x8 Am.JuR. Elections § 25 (2938).
"ONE STEP FonwAu,, Two STEps BACK (2904), analyzing the Second Party Congress.
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fair-minded men in no reasonable doubt that there is a grave and unnecessary in'' 4
equality between the different districts. 3
Evaluation of these precedents differs depending on whether one focuses on
adjudication of constitutionality in the abstract, which may approach the advisory
opinion type of action forbidden in federal jurisprudence 3 5 or focuses on effectiveness of judicial relief, where the general record is barren indeed?' Here again, the
degree of precision of the standard of legality, which interacts with the question
of feasibility of remedy, may influence the decision to assimilate some cases to the
dearly justiciable declaratory judgment category, others to the more dubious advisory opinion category.
The disposition of state courts to assume even an advisory opinion or declaratory
judgment type of jurisdiction in legislative apportionment and districting cases was
considerably diminished in the fifteen year period prior to Baker v. Carr. The influence of the Supreme Court's admonition in Colegrove v. Green' s in 1946 that
courts should stay out of the "political thicket" is apparent, particularly in the later
cases. States represented include Wisconsin,39 Oklahoma, 40 Alabama,41 Tennessee,42
Pennsylvania, 3 Michigan, 44 and Mississippi.45 The prior disposition to assume jurisdiction but deny affirmative relief seemed to be continued in cases in Wisconsin, 6
"4 Brophy v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, supra note 31. This Suffolk County
litigation, it may be noted, only involved action against county officials, not the state legislature.
"Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (igii). Advisory opinions on constitutional questions are
authorized by the constitutions of some states. Field, The Advisory Opinion-An Analysis, 24 IND. LJ.
203 (949).
s. Lewis and Walter would concur on this latter point. WALTiaR, supra notes 22, 23; Lewis, supra
note 2s, at io69. Indeed the section heading in Lewis, "State Experience: Judicial Intervention Can
Work," is considerably undercut, if not negated, by his subsequent well-documented summary statement
that the "performance of the state courts has been especially weak in fashioning remedies for the wrongful
refusal of legislatures to reapportion."
37 W
VuEras H. AssDaRsoN, ACTsONS FOR DCLAmTORY JuDGmEN-rs (2d ed. I95i);
EDwIN M. BORcHARD,
DECLARATORY JuDGmETrs (2d ed. 194).
"

328 U.S. 549 (1946)ex rel. Broughton v. Zimmerman, 261 Wis. 398, 52 N.W.2d 903 (1952); State ex rel.

SOState

Martin v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. ioi, 23 N.W.2d 6oi (1946), both citing Colegrove v. Green.
" Romang v. Cordell, 200 Okla. 369, 243 P.ad 677 (1952); Latting v. Cordell, 197 Okla. 369,
172 P.2d 397 (X946).
Neither cited Colegrove v. Green but Romang relied on the earlier "Fergus"
cases in Illinois, supra notes 24-26, which express the Colegrove principle.
"Waid v. Pool, 255 Ala. 441, 51 So.ad 869 (g5i).
" Kidd v. McCanless, 2oo Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.ad 40 (1956), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 920 (1956).

The case was a forerunner of Baker v. Cart and turned on a narrow point. The chancery court had
"simply made a declaration that [Tennessee has] no valid reapportionment statute and then fell back on
the de facto doctrine in order to avoid the otherwise necessary conclusion that . . . [Tennessee] would
no longer have any lawfully elected members of the General Assembly." Id. at 279, 292 S.W.2d at 43The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, finding the doctrine inapplicable, and hence, judicial intervention unthinkable.
' Butcher v. Rice, 397 Pa. 158, 153 A.ad 869 (1959); Costello v. Rice, 397 Pa. 198, 153 A.ad 888
(1959); companion cases relying on Colegrove v. Green.
"Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 (196o); vacated and remanded (in light of Baker
v. Cart), 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
"Barnes v. Barnett, 241 Miss. 206, 129 So.2d 638 (I961), dictum, citing Colegrove v. Green.

• State ex tel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 Wis. 644, 6o N.W.ad 416 (1953). The court voided
on procedural grounds a constitutional amendment on which a new apportionment act was based, thus
reinstating the apportionment act of 1951. The constitutional amendment was in violation of the
provision that multiple amendments must be voted on separately.
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Washington, 4 7 and Florida s But the first two turned on narrow fact situations and
the Florida apportionment was left undisturbed. All of these cases involved state
legislative districts. Federal district courts, as would be expected, and the Supreme
Court on appeal, followed the Colegrove approach in a number of cases, 49 prior
to the reversal of the federal district court in Baker v. Carr °
Exceptions to the Colegrove-influenced negative response occurred in three
cases much discussed in the Baker v. Carr litigation. Two courts-one state and one
federal-assumed jurisdiction of state legislative apportionment cases and then postponed decision on the merits to give the legislature opportunity to reconsider the
matter. 5' But in dicta the courts also gave indication that continued legislative inaction would result in invalidation of existing districts and judicial relief in unspecified ways. In a third case, the Hawaiian territorial district court reached the
merits and announced orally that it would grant relief without detailing the manner.52 Disparaged in Baker v. Carr by Justice Clark as a form of judicial "blackjacking, ' , 3 and by Justice Frankfurter as "in terrorem pronouncements,"'" the
judicial activity did achieve results in the form of legislative action in all three
cases 5 The "blackmail" question aside, the crucial issue is whether courts should
go adventuring in areas where remedial power may be more hope than reality.
Is it sufficient to say that judicial power in major governmental cases always rests
on good faith and voluntary compliance anyway? 50
"State v. Meyers, 51 Wash. 2d 454, 319 P.2d 828 (1957). The court left undisturbed a 1957 legislative modification of a 1956 initiative approved by the voters regarding apportionment.
" Brewer v. Gray, 86 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1956).
"oW.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 202 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), vacated and remanded, 370 U.S. 190

(x962); Perry v. Folsom, X44 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ala. 1956). Prior to Baker challenges had been
rejected in Supreme Court per curiam opinions as follows: Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (x907)
(Okla.); Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952) (Pa.); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947)
(Ill.); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (Ga.); Turman v. Duckworth 329 U.S. 675 (1946)
(Ga.). All involved state legislative districts except the two Georgia cases which involved the county
unit system.
"0The district court had dismissed on authority of Colegrove v. Green. x79 F. Supp. 824 (M.D.
Tenn. 1959).
"XMagraw v. Donovan, x63 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958); Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. W0ooley, 33
N.J. x, I6I A.2d 705 (I96O).
"ZDyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956), reversed on other grounds, 256
F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1958). The Dyer case and the Magraw case (ibid.) are discussed here because
they influenced the New Jersey state court in Asbury Park Press (ibid.), and, also under the "Federal
Court" heading, text infra at notes 117-20.
"5 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. x86, 260 (x962).
4
" 1d. at 270.
"Subsequent developments are reported as follows: Minnesota case, 177 F. Supp. 803 (D. Minn.
1959); New Jersey case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, x961, pp. i and x6; Hawaii case, Lewis, Legislative
Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1o88-89 (i958).
"Regarding acceptance of judicial curbs on executive action, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) involving presidential seizure, is comforting, but see Prize Cases, 67 U.S.
(2 Black) 635 (1863), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), where during wartime
executive power, albeit concurred in by Congress, was upheld, and Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2 (i866) where the war had been won before the power was negated.
Regarding acceptance of judicial curbs on legislative action, Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957) likewise is comforting, but use of the Watkins doctrine in more recent contempt of Congress cases
has caused rumblings that if the Court continues to free contemnors Congress should resort to direct
contempt punishment.
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Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe 7 although first in time of these three cases, may be
lowest in precedent value not only because it involved a relatively narrow standard
but also because the court analogized its power as a federal territorial court to the
power of state courts over "inferior legislative" bodies such as cities and countiesY8
Now that Hawaii and Alaska have achieved statehood, Dyer also represents a
diminishing category of courts. The court was not state, not federal in the "constitutional court" sense, but federal in the "legislative court" sense, effectuating the will
of Congress in the territory. 9 The challenge to the malapportioned Hawaiian territorial legislature was founded on fifty-five years of noncompliance with the congressional mandate to reapportion from "time to time." Because of the territorial
aspect the court felt that Colegrove with its overtones of delicacy of federal-state
relations posed no barrier to enforcement of this demand.
On remedies the court was more indefinite. It talked in strong terms of a power
to "order affirmative action to readjust legislative districts to population needs,"' but
also spoke of the possibility of an election at large. However, having scaled the
mountain it found no enemy to repel because, shortly after the court announced it
was prepared to grant relief, Congress mooted the matter. By amendment to the
Organic Act, Congress redistricted and shifted authority for future reapportionment
to the governor, subject to judicial control,"' which Hawaii retains in her present
state constitution. 2
Magraw v.Donovan, 3 like Baker v.Carr,was a petition to a federal district court
in Minnesota seeking to use the equal protection of the laws clause of the fourteenth
amendment as the lever to achieve reapportionment of the legislature. The stratagem
was successful, but the case, like Baker v. Carr, in its present posture, throws no
light on the crucial question of the substantive meaning of equal protection because
the court never had to decide the merits. Its retention of jurisdiction, and its dictum
'
that "it is obvious that substantial inequality exists," 64
were sufficient to induce
action at the next session of the Minnesota legislature. The greater anomaly of how
the Minnesota federal district court-a regular "constitutional" court unlike the
Dyer court-got around the Colegrove precedent so as even to be in a threatening
position, is discussed below.65
Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley 6 was simpler than Magraw on the question
of standards because it was a petition to a New Jersey state court to enforce a manda57138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956), reversed on other grounds, 256 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. x958).
8

I1d. at 234-35.
On the distinction between "constitutional" and "legislative" courts see works by Harris and by
Dixon, op. cit. supra note z6; HENRY H. HART, JR. & H.RDERT WaCHsLER, TnE FEDERAL COuRTS AND
THE FEDERAL SysTaa ch. 2 generally and 348-72 (1953).
'*Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, supra note 52, at 235.
" Discussed in Lewis, supra note 55, at io88-89.
02 Art. III, § 4a 59 F. Supp. 9o (D. Minn. 1958), 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958), 177 F. Supp. 803 (D.
Minn. 1959).
a& 163 F. Supp. r84, at 187.
'

5

" See text infra at notes 117-120.
ea33 N.J. i, 161 A.2d 705 (i96o).
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tory duty, imposed by the state constitution, to reapportion every ten years. The
plaintiffs here, as in Magraw, sought to avoid the appearance of proceeding directly
against the legislature by requesting a declaration that the existing apportionment
statute was invalid and an order against its continued use as a basis for elections.0 7
Despite the exactness of the standard and its clear violation by non-apportionment
in i95o the New Jersey court did not decide the merits although it suggested there
might also be a violation of equal protection and discussed various possible remedies.
It retained jurisdiction to give the legislature an opportunity to act once the 196o
figures were available; and the legislature acted 03
A more dramatic example of judicial activism regarding apportionment occurred
in Oregon in i96i when the state supreme court invalidated a reapportionment
plan and directed the Oregon Secretary of State to draft a reapportionment in compliance with the state constitution 9 To place this case in proper context it must
be noted, first, that the state constitution contains detailed mathematical formulae
and, second, that the state constitution provides that if the legislature fails to reapportion, it shall be done by the Secretary of State. Judicial review is specifically
authorized.
A number of other states, in an attempt to depoliticize reapportionment and
avoid the separation of powers impasse, likewise provide for use of the administrative
process either as an alternative or a substitute for the legislative process of reapportionment,70 sometimes coupled, as in Oregon, with express provisions for judicial review.
Effectiveness of these devices as ways of achieving numerically equitable apportionments depends not only on the frequency of their use, but also on the substantive
limits which state constitutions place on the discretion of the apportioning body."'
Even the administrative process, judicially impelled and reviewed, is no answer to
the problem of state apportionment formulae which effectively defeat numerical
equality by placing a ceiling on representation from populous counties or provide
minimum guarantees for non-populous counties. The federal equal protection
principle, if further developed in Baker v. Cart" and other current litigation 73
may override some of the state constitutional commands.
"' "Standing" created no problem.

The petitioners were residents in Magraw, taxpayers in Asbury

Park Press, and a voter in Dyer.

"sN.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1961, p. i, col. 2; p. x6, col. 2.
"9Inre Review of Chapter 482, Oregon Laws x961, 228 Ore. 562, 364 P.2d 1004 (1961); In re Apportionment of Senators and Representatives, 228 Ore. 575, 365 P.2d 1042 (1961).
"' See tabulation, Council of State Governments, THE BooK oF THE STATEs, 1962-1963 at 58-62
(1962). The fourteen states, and dates of last reapportionment, are: Alaska (1956), Arizona, lower
house only (1958), California (ig6i), Hawaii (1959), Illinois (955), Michigan, lower house only
(1953), Missouri, lower house only (1961), New Jersey, lower house only (196x), North Dakota, lower
house only (196i), Ohio (196i), Oregon (xg6i), South Dakota (1961), Texas (xg6x).
For judicial action under these provisions, see Lewis, supra note 55, at 1o9o. Also see JErFFEsoN B.
FoRDHAss, THE STATE LEoISATaIVE INSTITutIoN 46-47 (1959); AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE Ass'K,
STATE LEoGsLATuRas 41-44 (Zeller ed. 1954); American Political Science Ass'n, Report of
AmmucA
Committee on Apportionment of Congress, 45 Am. POL. Scm. REv. 153-57 (1946).
' See tabulations of state reapportionment formulae in Charts I-Il1 in Appendix.
' The Supreme Court did not reach the merits in Baker v. Carr.
13 See text infra at note 25r et seq.
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B. Basis of Complaint: State Law, Federal Law
In addition to distinguishing state court action from federal court action it is
also important to separate state law grounds for challenging legislative apportionment and districting from federal grounds. State law grounds cover a wide gamut
of constitutional and statutory provisions, some quite discretionary but many quite
clear and simple 4 For example, there may be fixed ceilings on size of the legislature or one house,75 fixed ratios between the state senate and state lower house,"
mandates to follow town boundaries," and contiguity requirements. 8 The federal
law basis for challenge to state legislative districts is the elusive "equal protection"
guarantee of the fourteenth amendment, augmented possibly by due process considerations. These clauses, it must be stressed, are not even phrased in terms of
population considerations. For challenge of congressional districts it is the same
broad basis, augmented formerly by the compactness, contiguity, and population
requirements of some of the older federal apportionment acts."9 Obviously, cases
in state courts adjudicating relatively narrow state law standards, which constitute
much of the state law litigation,"0 are of slight relevance to a federal court challenge
to a whole legislature under a generalized equal protection theory.
C. State Legislative Districts-Congressional Districts
There is also a three-fold need to distinguish congressional district cases from
state legislative apportionment and districting cases. First, the degree of precision
of the standard of legality is often much greater in regard to some state legislative districts than in regard to congressional districts, as noted above. Second, the
theory of representation underlying state legislative districts differs markedly from
the theory of representation underlying congressional districts. Population as a
classifying principle, uncomplicated by other factors, seems to underlie the federal
constitutional principles concerning the House of Representatives.8 1 With the apportionment of seats to the states on a population basis, and changing decennially,
"4 E.g., the Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin cases discussed above, supra notes 69, 47, 46, respectively. And see generally Durfee, Apportionment of Representation in the Legislature:A Study of State
Constitutions, 43 MiCH. L. Rv. io9i (1945); Walter, Reapportionment of State Legislative Districts, 37
ILL. L. Rav. 20 (1942).
74State ex rel. Attorney General v. Francis, 26 Kan. 724 (1882), invalidating a law passed only with
the assistance of the "surplus" legislators from newly organized counties; Adams v. Forsyth and Robertson,
44 La. 130, zo So. 622 (1898); Sandoz v. Sanders, 125 La. 396, 51 So. 436 (igio).

" Caesar v. Williams, 371 P.2d 241 (Idaho x962).
" Tishman v. Sprague, 293 N.Y. 42, 55 N.E.2d 858 (x944).
71 Shoemaker v. Lawrence, 31 Pa. D. & C. 681 (C.P. Dauphin Cty. 1938).
"'These requirements in the Reapportionment Act of 1911, which was similar to previous acts in
the nineteenth century in this respect, were held by the Supreme Court in 1932 to have expired. Wood
v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932); Mahan v. Hume, 287 U.S. 575 (1932).
"°Durfee and Walter, supra note 74; Annot., 2 A.L.R. 1337 (2926).

" For an analysis of the historical materials bearing on the "democratic character of the House," see
Paschal, The House of Representatives: "Grand Depository of the Democratic Principle"?, 27 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRO. 276 (1952), and citations in Lewis, supra note 55, at 1071-73, to MAx FtARAND (ED.),
THE REcoans oF 7Ta FEDER.AL CONVEWrION oF 1787 (1911); to Ti-a FEzDaAusxr; and to JONAt HAN
ELLIOT, DEBATS ox THa FEDERAL CoNsTTr'ioN (2d ed. x836).
See also ROBE.RT Luc=, LEAGsATIVw
PRINCIPLES 359 (1930); L. F. ScH
crEzIRa, CoNGREssIoNAL APPoRTiosmin.NT (1941).
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it is a short step to argue that congressional districting within states should likewise
be on a straight population basis. More numerous and complicated factors, including
area, traditional local unit boundary lines, and bicameralism, enter the picture in regard to an equal protection plea against state legislative districts8 2
Third, remedies available, including the appropriateness of using an election at
large may be quite different. An order to an administrative official may suffice in
some state legislative districting cases 83 Congressional districting normally involves
action by the state legislature.
The superficially appealing possibility of an election at large has far greater
appropriateness for congressional elections, where a state voice in Congress is the
primary aim. For election of state legislators geographic diffusion which is part
of the theory of representation could be jeopardized or terminated by the voting
power of one or two urban areas where a majority of the electors reside.
D. Federal Courts: Apportionment Cases Before Baker v. Carr
The important starting date 4 for attempts to involve the Supreme Court in apportionment and districting matters is 1932. Two-thirds of the states were affected by
the congressional reapportionment after the i93o census. Where the state legislature
failed to redistrict in states receiving additional seats in the House of Representatives
the election at large device could be used for the additional representation, leaving
the previous districts intact for the remaining representatives and thus insuring
continued geographic spread of representation throughout the state8 5 The critical
problem was posed by states losing representation. In several of these states aftdr
the legislature had redistricted to absorb the loss, suits were filed challenging the
new districts. Four of these cases reached the Supreme Court, two from state courts 8
and two from federal district courts.8 7 The Supreme Court also received a state
court case from a state with increased representation 8
The three cases from the state courts turned on the applicability of the governor's
veto to a redistricting of congressional districts. As handled by the Supreme Court
they did not involve the question of the existence and applicability of overriding
federal substantive standards.
The leading case was Smiley v.Holm"9 from Minnesota and its decision con82 Durfee, supra note 74; Foamnswe, op. cit. supra note 70,

at 27-42; LucE,

op. cit. supra note 8x, at

364.

'3 See 196z Oregon litigation, supra note 69; Suffolk
County litigation, supra notes 31-34.
4

" Earlier unsuccessful attempts produced no articulation of principle, e.g., denial of certiorari in one
of the Illinois legislative district cases, supra note 25.
85
Scull, Legislative Apportionment and the Law, x8 TEmPE L.Q. 388 (1944); Koenig v. Flynn,
258 N.Y. 292, 179 N.E. 705 (1932), aff'd, 285 U.S. 375 (1932).
'eSmiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932), reversing 184 Minn. 228, 238 N.W. 494 (1931); Carroll
v. Becker, 329 Mo. 501, 45 S.W.2d 533 (1932), afl'd, 285 U.S. 380 (1932).
8

7Wood

v. Broom, 287 U.S.

i (1952),

reversing z F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Miss.

287 U.S. 575 (1932), reversing I F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Ky. 1932).
Koenig v. Flynn, supra note 85.
89285 U.S. 355 (5932), reversing x84 Minn. 228, 238 N.W. 494 (193).

had been reduced from ten to nine.

1932);

Mahan v. Hume,

Minnesota's representation
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trolled the other two, Carroll v.Becker 0 from Missouri and Koenig v. Flynn9 1 from

New York. In Smiley the petitioner sought a declaration of the invalidity of the
redistricting statute and an injunction against its use on the grounds, first, that
the governor's veto power applied to this matter and that the statute had not been
repassed over his veto, and second, that the statute violated the standards of compactness, contiguity, and population equality of the x911 Federal Reapportionment
Act. 2 The Minnesota Supreme Court, agreeing with the defense of the state
attorney general, ordered dismissal. 3 First, the court held that in this redistricting
the legislature was exercising a special federal constitutional power rather than a
normal state lawmaking power subject to gubernatorial review and veto. Second,
the court held that the Federal Reapportionment Act of 1911 with its substantive
standards on districting had expired, and said that, even if still in existence, this
aspect of the case would present a non-justiciable, political question.
The United States Supreme Court never got to this interesting second aspect of
the case. It simply reversed the state court on the first aspect of the case because it
found that the federal Constitution did not invest state redistricting with such special
character as to shield it from gubernatorial veto.9 4 In a dictum it noted that this
result left Minnesota with no valid districts and that absent a timely enactment of a
new and valid statute the only recourse would be election at large of Minnesota's
congressional delegation.Oa Similar results, and dicta on the appropriateness of an
97
6
election at large, followed in Carroll v. Becker? and Koenig v. Flynn.
The issue left unresolved in Smiley, i.e., the question of the existence and enforceability of the 1911 Reapportionment Act's standards against the states, was
resolved in appeals from two federal district courts, Wood v. Broom"8 and Mahan
v. Hume.9 There the Supreme Court ordered dismissal of injunctions which federal
district courts had issued against the new state districting statutes for noncompliance
with the standards of the 1911 Act. The Court concluded the 1911 Act had expired.

On the question of justiciability of apportionment suits, these five cases left some
questions unanswered. The Smiley opinion contained a cryptic remark suggestive
00 329 Mo. 501, 45 S.W.2d 533 (1932), afl'd, 285 U.S. 380 (1932). Missouri's representation had
been reduced from sixteen to thirteen.
12.58 N.Y. 292, 179 N.E. 705 (932), afl'd, 285 U.S. 375 (x932). New York's representation had
been increased from forty-three to forty-five. The legislature had sought to avoid the veto power by the
device of concurrent resolution.
"2 Act of Aug. 8, 1911, c1.5, §3, 37 Star. 53.
"State v. Holm, 184 Minn. 228, 238 N.W. 494 (I93).
"Smiley v. Holm, supra note 86.
"Id. at 374.
'e329 Mo. 501, 45 S.W.2d 533 (1932), afg'd, 285 U.S. 380 (1932). The Missouri Supreme Court's
dictum concerning an election at large, 45 S.W.2d 535, and quoted by the United States Supreme Court,
285 U.S. 382, sounds mandatory. However, the only action was to refuse to issue a mandamus to the
Secretary of State to order him to receive a filing of a candidacy under the new but vetoed law.
7258 N.Y. 292, 179 N.E. 705 (1932), afl'd, 285 U.S. 375 (1932)92287 U.S. 1 (1932), reversing z F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Miss. 1932). Mississippi's representation had
been reduced from eight to seven.
"287 U.S. 575 (1932), reversing i F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Ky. 1932). Kentucky's representation had
been reduced from eleven to nine.
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of the inference that recourse should be had to Congress for state malfunction on
congressional districts, and not to the courts, unless Congress specifically directs
otherwise. The Court said: "In exercising this power, the Congress may supplement
these state regulations or may substitute its own. It may impose additional penalties
for the violations of the state laws or provide independent sanctions. It 'has a
general supervisory power over the whole subject.'-100
Any such inference is severely undercut, however, by the Court's brushing aside
of the second plea in Smiley-alleged noncompliance with the standards of the 19xX
Act-as not being properly before the Court, in the light of its disposition of the
gubernatorial veto issue, and therefore "wholly abstract."' 1 This suggests the inference that in a proper case the Court would have power to consider the matter,
and might consider it appropriate to exercise this power.
These possible conflicting inferences were not resolved in Wood and Mahan,.
Justice Hughes' opinion of the Court, grounded on the conclusion that the 19xx Act
had expired, suggests the inference that if the act had not expired the Court would
have considered the question.' °2 But again, such an inference is undercut because
four members of the Court-Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo-would
have dismissed the suit for "want of equity."' 03 The "want of equity" phrase suggests a policy of judicial self-limitation analogous to the doctrine of political questions,
and probably indistinguishable in this context. It suggests that the Court normally
would not exercise jurisdiction in this kind of case, despite noncompliance with
either statutory or constitutional standards.
Justiciability is also affected by prospective unavailability of a feasible remedy, an
especially important consideration in apportionment suits. Failure to take account
of the background of Smiley and the related cases, and of the specific relief requested,
has produced erroneous assertions by several commentators that the federal courts
had assumed jurisdiction and ordered elections at large.0 4 These assertions create
the misleading impression that federal courts, even prior to Baker v. Carr, had
actively enforced federal substantive standards against the states in apportionment
and districting matters. Actually, the issue in Smiley was whether the new districting
statute could be saved by finding, in effect, a federal exemption from the gubernatorial
Smiley v. Holm, supra note 86, at 366-67.
Id. at 375.
Mahan v. Hume, supra note 87, was decided per curiam under
102 Wood v. Broom, supra note 87.
authority of Wood v. Broom.
"'8Wood v. Broom, supra note 87, at 8.
10'E.g., Lewis, supra note 55, at zo87-88; Brief for the United States as amicus curiae on reargument, pp. 52, 54; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. x86 (x962); CoMaNsSoN ON CIVIL RiosTs RE'oRT,
VOTING (VOL. I) X23, 128 (i96I).
One of the few accurate characterizations of Smiley and related cases is that given by Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr, supra note i, at 284-85: "Where, however, state law
has made particular federal questions determinative of relations within the structure of state government,
not in challenge of it, the Court has resolved such narrow, legally defined questions in proper proceed.
ings. . . . In such instances there is no conflict between state policy and the exercise of federal judicial
power. This distinction explains the decisions in Smiley v. Holm . . . Koenig V. Flynn . . . Carroll v.
Becker . . . in which the Court released state constitutional provisions prescribing local law-making
procedures from misconceived restriction of superior federal requirements."
100

101
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veto by treating redistricting of congressional districts as a non-legislative function
analogous to the role of state legislatures in ratification of federal constitutional
amendments. The Minnesota court had so held. If there were no federal exemption,
which was the Supreme Court holding, then by the sequence of congressionalaction
killing the old districts and gubernatorial action killing the new districts, rather
than by reason of court order, there would be no valid districts available. In this
situation an election at large would be the only way to preserve state representation
in Congress and could-and did-occur without specific court order.01 5 Indeed,
because of the absence of a Supreme Court-directed order for an election at large in
Smiley, a possibility existed that a special legislative session could have produced valid
districts in time for the election, or that Minnesota would hold no election of congressional representatives, which would have posed a fresh series of problems.
Before considering the next major federal case, Colegrove v. Green' 016 it would
be well to note that potentially there are three positions which the Supreme Court
may take in congressional districting cases, rather than two.
First, the Court could say that article one, section four of the Constitution confers
a plenary and exclusive power on Congress, and that the Court has no jurisdiction
to entertain a suit unless specifically authorized by Congress. Some language in
Smiley supports this idea.
Second, the Court could say that any standards Congress lays down by statute in
this field, or any standards of fairness and equality found in the fourteenth amendment's due process or equal protection of the laws clauses, are self-executing. This
could mean that federal courts would have jurisdiction under the general grant of
judicial power,'1 7 to entertain an appropriate suit for redress whenever a federal
standard found either in a statute or the Constitution is violated. Further, the courts
could proceed to exercise this jurisdiction.
Third, the federal courts could say that they have jurisdiction, as just delineated,
but could refuse to exercise jurisdiction on grounds of policy. This policy of not
exercising jurisdiction could be explained in such terms as "want of equity," or
"political question." At bottom it would be a policy of judicial self-restraint derived
from the Court's assessment of the proper limits of its role as guardian of public
morals in our political system. If the plaintiff's case rested on the fourteenth
amendment, or some other constitutional clause, rather than a federal statute, we
...A state court case resting on state law grounds eventuated in a mandamus which was in effect
an order for an election at large of Virginia's congressional delegation in 1932. Brown v. Saunders, x59
Va. 28, x66 S.E. 1o5 (932).
The Virginia legislature redistricted after its congressional delegation was
reduced from ten to nine but the governor refused to sign the bill. In the ensuing litigation Brown
and others sought and obtained a mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Commonwealth to accept
their filings as candidates at large. The court based its decision on a Virginia Constitution provision,
not generally found in state constitutions, that congressional districts be "composed of contiguous and
compact territory, and containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants."
108 328 U.S. 549 (1946)10728 U.S.C. S X343 (x958). In so far as the state law was a violation of a federal constitutional
standard, Rnv. SrAT. § 1979 (1875), 4 2"U.S.C. § 1983 (x958).
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would be justified in referring to such policy of judicial self-restraint as a constitutional policy regarding the limits of judicial review.
Of all the precedent cases, Colegrove v. Green casts the longest shadow over the
Baker v. Carr litigation. Because Colegrove involved congressional districts while
Baker involves state legislative districts, there may be some ground to argue, albeit
narrow, that the holding of justiciability in Baker does not necessarily overrule
Colegrove. In Colegrove a seven-man Supreme Court split 4-3 in dismissing a suit

seeking to restrain further use of Illinois' congressional districts on the ground that
inequality in population violated the fourteenth amendment. But the court split
3-3-I in its reasoning.

Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion, in which only two others concurred, is not
easy to characterize. It is one of those opinions that says all things to all men, and
has even been cited by some lower court judges in support of exercise of jurisdiction
where state legislative districts, rather than congressional districts, were at issue.10 8
Justice Frankfurter may have put the dismissal under the first of the three potential
positions delineated above-that is, lack of jurisdiction. He relied in part on article
one, section four, of the Constitution and Smiley v. Holm °0 for the proposition that
the Court lacked power (i.e., jurisdiction) to proceed, the matter being exclusively
committed to Congress. But he also talked about the danger of courts entering the
"political thicket"' " 0 which is language more appropriate to position three. There
also was language phrased in terms of standing to sue, doctrine of political questions,
delicacy of federal-state relations, and unsuitability of the remedy of election at large.
As the Solicitor General observed in his brief as amicus curiae in Baker v. Carr,the
"relative importance which the three justices joining in this opinion attached to these
factors is not clear.""'
Justice Rutledge joined the Frankfurter contingent in the 4-3 vote to dismiss,
but clearly put his vote under position three-there is jurisdiction per se, but for
policy reasons it should not be exercised. Justice Black and two others, dissenting,
would adopt position two-there is jurisdiction, and it should be exercised.
If the decision in Colegrove really rested on a theory of exclusive commitment of
congressional districting matters to Congress, then no later decisions concerning
justiciability in federal courts regarding state legislative districts or vote-weighting
schemes can affect it. However, if the theory of exclusive commitment to Congress,
and the resulting lack of judicial jurisdiction be laid aside, Colegrove becomes a
"political question" case. This view is supported by the per curiam opinion in South
v. Peters'" where the Court dismissed a federal district court challenge to the Georgia
10

E.g., Magraw v. Donovan, 159 F. Supp. 9o

(D. Minn. 1958); Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F.

Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii i956); Latting v. Cordell, 197 Okla. 369, 172 P.2d 397 (1946) (dissenting
opinion).
109 Smiley v. Holm, supra note 86.
1
Colegrove v. Green, supra note io6, at 556.
o
"'Brief for the United States Amicus Curiae, pp. 29-3 , Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. x86 (1962).
The suit was an attempt to challenge the Georgia county unit system of
112339 U.S. 276 (195o).
determining the victor in state-wide primary elections. Under the system victory went to the candidate
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county unit system of weighting votes in favor of rural areas with this statement:
"Federal courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers in cases posing

political issues arising from a state's geographic distribution of electoral strength
among its political subdivisions." 1 3 This language concedes jurisdiction but finds a
policy basis for not acting. Viewed as a political question case, Colegrove is severely
undercut by Baker v. Carr and possibly overruled, unless the Court chooses to take
a narrow approach when it comes to defining the federal right now being litigated in
Baker on remand to the district court. South v. Peters seems clearly overruled.
However, because of the complexity and variety of the possible arrangements for

apportionment, districting, and vote-weighting, it may be possible to have a continuum
of justiciability in this field.'

4

The negative thrust of Colegrove regarding federal court action on apportionment
and districting matters was reinforced by a series of per curiam dismissals of federal
district court suits." 5

It was not substantially undercut either by the anomalous

opinion in MacDougall v. Green"" or Magraw v. Donovan."1

The contrary de-

cision in Magraw concerning reapportionment of the Minnesota legislature, which

did not reach the Supreme Court, was achieved almost inadvertently. The single
judge". with whom the petition was filed denied the motion to dismiss because he

found that jurisdiction in the sense of a colorable federal claim was present. His
attempt to distinguish the Colegrove and South v. Peters precedents was brief to the
point of being casual, and he did not distinguish jurisdiction and justiciability. The
who prevailed in the total county unit vote, which was allocated in each county to the candidate with
the popular vote plurality in that county. In the basic allocation of "units," the more populous counties
were discriminated against. This special, and particularly pernicious, species of the gerrymander, was
alleged to violate the fourteenth and seventeenth amendments in regard to equal protection of the laws
and right to an equal vote for United States senators. For discussion of the Georgia county unit
system prior to the litigation following Baker v. Carr, see Cornelius, The County Unit System of Georgia:
Facts
POL. Q. 942 (i96i).
115and Prospects, 14 WasTa"r
Id. at 277- (Emphasis added.)
'X'A continuum perhaps already exists. Suits about rights of individual voters to be enrolled and
receive a ballot and have it counted fairly are clearly justiciable. It has been argued that these suits
differ only in degree and not in kind from legislative apportionment, under one broad heading of "election process." See Justice Douglas, concurring in Baker v. Carr, supra note i, at 247-49.
...Listed supra note 49.
lid 335 U.S. 281 (1948). The suit involved a federal constitutional challenge to the Illinois law
requiring a petition containing at least 2oo signatures from each of fifty of the state's one hundred and
two counties as a precondition of placing nominees of a new political party on the ballot. The law was
an obstacle to activities by the Progressive Party whose nominees for President and Vice President in
1948 were Henry Wallace and Glen Taylor. The federal district court in one breath upheld the
constitutionality of the law and in the next breath denied it had jurisdiction. 80 F. Supp. 725 (N.D.
Ill. 1948). The Supreme Court affirmed but some language in the opinion, as augmented by Justice
Rutledge's separate concurrence, led the Solicitor General in his amicus curiae brief in Baker v. Carr
to say that the Court had passed on the merits. Brief for the United States as amicus curiae on Reargument, pp. 56-57, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). However, MacDougall (i) did not involve
apportionment but rather a geographic diffusion rule imposed as a condition of getting a new political
party on the ballot, (2) may have been decided on justiciability grounds because the Court cited the
Colegrove principle, and (3) as Justice Frankfurter has said, "of decisive significance is whether in each
situation the ultimate decision has been to intervene or not to intervene." Baker v. Carr, supra at 285.
117 159 F. Supp. goi (D. Minn. 1958), x63 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958), 177 F. Supp. 803 (D.
Minn. x959). See text supra at note 63.
lie 159 F. Supp. 9o (D. Minn. 1958).
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resultant three-judge district court 1 9 then proceeded to approach the merits without
ever discussing justiciability--that is, the question whether the court should exercise
its technical jurisdiction. The justiciability issue thus fell between two stools, and
was never meaningfully treated.' 20
The Tuskegee gerrymandering case, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 2 ' in which the
Court voided an Alabama statute which had purported to detach from the town of
Tuskegee most of the territory on which Negro voters resided, likewise did not
foretell the Baker v. Carr decision. Even conceding that Gomillion would rest
more soundly on the equal protection clause, where Justice Whittaker would put
it,'22 than on the fifteenth amendment where Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the
Court put it,'23 it differs from Baker v. Carrin two major respects. First, it involved
state action obviously geared to race which has been almost a per se violation of the
fourteenth amendment ever since Strauder v. West Virginia.'2 4 Second, a ready
remedy was available in the form of an injunction to restore the previous boundaries.
E. State of the Law on the Eve of Baker v. Carr
This review of state court and federal court action on apportionment and districting matters prior to Baker P. Carr yields several generalizations. In addition
to the fact that state judiciaries are not bound by the federal separation of powers
doctrine and federal precepts of justiciability, there has been a general lack of precise
discussion either of issues of standing or justiciability in the state cases. The older
breed of rough-and-ready state judges tended to ignore these niceties of advanced
jurisprudence. Even where state courts acted, they were weak in formulating
remedies and rarely did more than invalidate legislative action, often under relatively
219

163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958).

"'Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii i956), reversed on other grounds, 256 F.2d
728 (9th Cir. 1955), which also did not reach the Supreme Court, involved a territorial court, not a
constitutional court. It was decided specifically on the ground that the issue did not involve federalstate relations, Hawaii still being a territory.
125 364

See discussion, text supra at note 57 dt seq.

U.S. 339 (i96o). The background and the flavor of the oral argument in the Supreme Court
are portrayed in BENaRD TAPER, GOmLION vERsus Lsoisnroor: Tim TusCEoFE GEuRYm, v£1 CAsE
(1962).
2

. Id. at 349: "But it does seem clear to me that accomplishment of a State's purpose--to use the

Court's phrase--of 'fencing Negro citizens out' of Division A and into Division B is an unlawful segregation of races of citizens, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .... "
"'Id.at 346. Because there was no showing that the Negroes were being deprived of voting in their

new "location," it would seem that their basic loss was in being segregated in regard to various benefits
of urban life of which voting in city elections was only one facet. An equal protection plea is more
responsive to such a situation than a fifteenth amendment plea of a right to vote free from racial restraint.

justice Frankfurter's fifteenth amendment approach was, of course, a way of acting in the Alabama
situation while at the same time doing as little violence as possible to the Colegrove precedent.
124 100 U.S. 303 (I88o), reversing conviction of Negro defendant by jury on which only whites were

eligible to serve. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), by rejecting the separate but
equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), seems to mark a return to the broad principle
of Strauder. The great fallacy of Plessy was to make the constitutionality of official racial segregation
turn on reasonableness by analogy to the economic regulation and tax cases where classification was
deemed permissible if it had a rational basis. The one clear meaning of the equal protection clause,
absolute racial equality before the law, which had not been questioned theretofore, was thus opened to the
erosion of plausible exceptions-exceptions perhaps necessary in economic regulation but disastrous to
the goals of equality of status of the natural person.
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precise state constitutional standards. In the i96o case in New Jersey where a suit
successfully impelled legislative action, the state court was never compelled to show
its hand.

25

Federal courts had quite consistently adopted a hands-off attitude, particularly
since the Colegrove decision in 1946. In the two exceptions in Hawaii2 6 and Minnesota,127 the federal district courts, like the New Jersey state court in 1966, did not

have to reach a decision under a broad substantive standard or shape a remedy.
Influenced by the Colegrove example, the later state trend seemed to be away from
the earlier disposition to assume a "remediless jurisdiction."
No court, federal or state, has ordered an election at large as a remedy for malapportionment of state legislatures. 128 Election at large of a state's entire congressional delegation has resulted from failure to pass valid redistricting statutes after
state apportionments were changed by congressional action. It has not resulted from
judicial imposition of substantive federal standards, with one exception in which
the standard was statutory; and there the Supreme Court reversed the lower court
after the congressional election had been held. 29 Further, in a precise sense, federal
courts have not ordered elections at large' 30
The major about-face in both federal and state courts impelled by Baker v. Carr
is thus not to be minimized by citing an occasional variant straw in the wind.
Unlike Brown v. Board of Education,'3 ' it was not well signalled by a series of cases
in the Supreme Court, or any other courts. What Baker V. Carr represents is an
agony of democracy. The Supreme Court, without precedent, finally concluded that
some judicial participation in the politics of the people-to a degree as yet undetermined-was a precondition to there being any effective politics.
Ii

Tim

POLITICAL SETING

Preparation of charts and tables on rotten boroughs and malapportionment problems has long been an eminently respectable pastime of social scientists even though

the effort has normally been more productive of depressing description than productive of effective remedial action. There probably has not been a period in our
...Asbury Park Press, v. Woolley, supra note 66.
12' Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, supra note 57, involved a statutory mandate to reapportion.
227Magraw v. Donovan, supra note 63, involved equal protection but the case was mooted because
the legislature acted.
1L58 One state court, however, has said such action would be contrary to the state constitution.
Kidd v.
McCanless, supra note 42; ci. Daly v. County of Madison, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N.E.2d i6o ('94'). See Lewis,
s"pra note 55, at 1071 n.82.
...Hume v. Mahan, i F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Ky. 1932), rev'd per curiam, 287 U.S. 575 (1932) on

authority of Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932). See discussion, text supra at note 99.
IS0 The only clear example of judicial action amounting to an order for an election at large
seems to be a state case concerning congressional districting and decided under the state constitution.
Brown v. Saunders, supra note 105.
131 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which was foreshadowed by several decisions against racial inequalities in
higher education: Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), which considered intangible as well as tangible
inequalities; McLauren v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (295o); Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332
U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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history when striking population disparities and gross underrepresentation of particular groups and sections has not existed 3 2 The struggle of Piedmont against
Tidewater, of back-country against coastal plain, dates from colonial times,'83 and
has been a more serious problem for democracy than the related question of voting
qualifications. 34
But as wealth has shifted from land to personalty and corporate intangiblesincluding the inherent power of organization itself-the legislatures have come to
represent neither people nor wealth, except as the latter could find a shared interest
in the rural legislators' lukewarm approach to social welfare and big government.
Also, like Eve after the apple, there has been a great change in sensitivity to the
population factor in representation formulae. To generations reared in the cult of
the ballot the flow of malapportionment statistics has seemed like desecration of the
35
temple of democracy.'
More critically, from the standpoint of civic leadership, the newer statistics have
shown that the traditional urban-rural split in representation has taken on the new
dimension of suburban underrepresentation' 3 6 This has seemed to mean that society's
best-if education, culture, positions of leadership in the professions and business,
and other associations mean anything-were exercising the least direct influence on
government.
Against this long-standing and probably worsening problem of underrepresentation of people simply as people, there has been a disheartening chain of failure of
attempts at amelioration through usual channels of political action. At the national
level, Congress has shown neither disposition nor capacity to police congressional
districting through its conceded power of control over its own membership and over
.32See generally: FRANcis N. THORPE, CONSTTUTIONAL HIs'toRY OF TnE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 1776x85o, at 258-59, 431-55 (898); id. at 96-z29, 183 et seq., 392-435 (1898); FRANcis N. THORPE, Tua
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1765-1895, at 426 (Ig0I); ROBERT LuCE, LEGISLATIVE
PRINCIPLES 350-57, 365-68; symposium, Legislative Reapportionment, 17 LAW & CONTErMP. PRoB. 253-469
(1952), especially Short, States That Have Not Met Their Constitutional Requirements, id. at 337; Bone,

States Attempting to Comply with Reapportionment Requirements, id. at 387; Hinderaker & Waters, A
Case Study in Reapportionment-California5951, id. at 440; PAUL T. DAvID & RALPiH EISENBERO, DnVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN VOTE (961); NATIONAL MUmCIPAL LEAGUE, COMPENDIUM ON
LEGISLATIVE AppoRTIoNMENT (2d ed. x962); L. F. SCHMECxEBIER, CONoRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT 127-94
(1941); AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE Ass'N, AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATR ES 30-46 (Zeller ed. 1954).
...Ibid. See also JAcxsoN T. MAIN, THE ANTiPEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONsrTuTION, 1781-i788,
at 17-24, 28 et seq. (196i).
"" J. ALLAN NEvINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION, 1775-1789, at 95-96,
114-X5, 131-34 (1924). Nevins indicates that malrepresentation, both in terms of area and population,
was endemic in the colonial legislatures, and was only partially and gradually ameliorated in the revolutionary and constitution-building era. Property qualifications for voting played their part, but the most
striking malrepresentation was in the grossly insufficient number of seats awarded to the growing back
country in the Carolinas and Virginia. Also see ROBERT E. BRowN, MIDDLE-CLA/s DEMOCRACY AND
Tim REVOLUTION IN MAssAcI-usETrs, 1691-1780 (1955); ROaERT E. BRowN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE
CoNsrrrTION 61-72 (1956). In his first work, Brown shows that property qualifications were so low
that few men in Massachusetts were disfranchised. In his second work he draws similar conclusions
regarding other states and finds little evidence for Beard's famous thesis that only a tiny electorate ratified
the Constitution.

"'See charts IV and V in Appendix.
' Ibid. Also see Friedman, Reapportionment Myth, 49 NAT. Civic REv. 184 (196o).

349

LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT

the seating of persons sent by the states. From the census of 187o to the census of
1gio the federal reapportionment acts required the state legislatures to devise congressional districts of "equal" population and "contiguous" territory,' 37 and after

the census of igoo the requirement of "compactness" was added. 31 And yet during
this period, even though it preceded the big wave of urbanization, there were important disparities of population between districts in many states. That the disparities
were not greater than they were is to be attributed not so much to an attempt to
abide by the standards as to the fact that urbanization had not reached full flower.'3
The House of Representatives has never taken unequal representation seriously,
although the matter was at least discussed on three occasions :140 1843, when four
states did not use districts at all; goi, involving a Kentucky district; and

19io,

in-

volving a Virginia district. Because Congress at any given time is itself the product
of a mixed and imperfect apportionment and districting process, to expect Congress
to take forceful action on this problem is to expect a stream to rise above its source.
Interminable wrangles and interstate reprisals, compounded both by party and sectional alignments, would flow from such action. Proposals for more vigorous congressional action and bills introduced in recent congresses to take a more positive
approach have gone unheeded. 141
In the state legislatures such recent progress as has been made has been due in part
to the efforts of the governor, as urban spokesman,' 42 but a glance at the figures in
IST

17 Stat. 28 (1872); 37 Stat. 13, 14 (191I).
IOS 31 Stat. 733 (i9oi). These requirements were dropped in 1929.

46 Stat. 21 (1929).

""'Examples of population disparities between districts under the i9Io census are given in SCHMECKEBIER, op. cit. supra note 132, at 153, 154, 156, 162, 172, 175; e.g., Colorado, largest district 228,444 and
smallest district 134,469; Connecticut, 25o,182 and 190,403; Illinois, 349,883 and 167,634; Louisiana,
234,382 and 165,563; New York, 3oo,ooo and 194,7o8; Ohio, 264,297 and 164,474. A list covering all
the states for the year 1897 is found in appendix I to Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549, 557-59 (1946).
"o SCMIECKFIaSIa, op. cit. supra note 132, at 135-38. The reasons for rejecting the challenges in
the latter two instances, as given in the congressional committee reports, have been summarized as
follows: "(x) Such action would leave the voters in the affected districts without any representation for
two years. (2) It would put enforcement of the equality requirement in the hands of the transitory
House majority and might lead to politicking on a larger scale with the apportionment problem. (3)
Members would be prey to constant uncertainty, not knowing when their seats might become pawns in
some party struggle in the House. (4) To enforce equality 'spasmodically' by occasional challenges to
seating would be unfair and ineffective; it should be done 'universally' as to all districts." Lewis, supra
note 55, at 1094.

'" E.g., American Political Science Ass'n, Report of Committee on Reapportionment of Congress, 45
Am. POL. ScI. Rs v. 153 (i95i); Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Reapportionment of the
House Committee on the Judiciary on Establishment of Congressional Districts, 82d Cong., ist Sess., ser.
21 (1g5i); Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Increasing
the Membership of the House of Representatives and Redistricting Congressional Districts, 87th Cong.,
ist Sess., ser. 9 (i96i); S.J. Res. 141, 87 th Cong., ist Sess. (5961), constitutional amendment proposed by
Senator Clark to require substantial equality in population of congressional districts.
A common feature of the bills is to forbid deviation by more than a specified percentage, e.g., 15%,
from the average district population of the state, enforced either by Congress through refusal to seat
members from improper districts or by a voter suit in federal district court.
141 Bone, States Attempting to Comply with Reapportionment Requirements, 17 LAw & CoNrEMs'.
PRoB. 387, 413-14 (1952). One of the amicus curiae briefs filed in Baker v. Car was by Oklahoma
Governor J. Howard Edmondson.
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a recent survey show that the results have not been striking.14 Indeed, malapportionment of state legislatures is far worse than malapportionment of congressional
districts. The initiative, available in only a minority of the states, has been quite
ineffective. 4 4
In short, political avenues of redress have proven to be dead-end streets. Population growth and shift have worsened, rather than lessened, the long-standing problem. Against this background the traditional closing line of the opinions of noninterventionist courts that redress lay through the ballot box and not through the
courts-that the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy-took on an increasingly hollow ring. Effective representation of urban-suburban interests had
become a direct function of executive leadership. It may be that this background,

more than legal disputation on precedents and problems of remedy, dictated the
Baker v. Carr decision. The structure of the democratic state itself was at stake,
once it be conceded that population merits a prominent place, if not a dominant place,
in any representation formula.

III
BAKER v. CAmR: THE DEciIoN
The Supreme Court decision in Baker v. Carr"' can aptly be described as a threelegged stool, with a crucial fourth leg yet to be constructed. The Court found
that federal district courts had jurisdiction of claims that state legislative apportionments are in violation of the fourteenth amendment. It found that the plaintiffs
had standing as resident voters to assert such a claim. It held that such claims were

justiciable despite previous "political question" precedents. It then remanded without reaching the merits and without giving the district court any guidance on the
possible nature or dimensions of a federal restriction on state discretion in apportionments. In sharply delineating these four elements which are present in all cases
whether separately considered or not, the Opinion of the Court written by Justice
Brennan dispelled the confusion which the district court had created by the intermixture of "jurisdiction" language and "justiciability" language in its dismissal. 140
Justices Douglas, Clark, and Stewart wrote separate concurrences; Justices Frankfurter and Harlan each wrote a separate dissent.
A. The Complaint and Factual Setting
Mindful of the "political thicket" precedents the plaintiffs placed some stress on
the previous unsuccessful political efforts to impel action under the state constitution's
""See chart V in Appendix.
1 , Bone, supra note X42, at 409-12; Brief of J. Howard Edmondson, Governor of the State of Oklahoma, as Amicus Curiae, pp. 14-17, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
5"
369 U.S. i86 (1952). The previous unsuccessful attempt to achieve redress in the state courts is
noted supra at note 42, Kidd v. McCanless, 2oo Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40, appeal disissed, 352 U.S.
The matter was started again in federal district court in x959, Baker v. Carr, 175 F. Supp.
920 (1956).
649 (M.D. Tenn. 1959), argued in the Supreme Court on April

x9-2o,

x961, set for reargument on

366 U.S. 907 (z961), and finally decided and remanded on March 26, 1962.
In dismissing the district court did
" Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824, 826 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
not attempt to distinguish between the two grounds.
Oct 9,

196I,
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provision for decennial reapportionments.1 47 The complaint asserted a federal right
to numerically equitable apportionment under which the legislative districts, not
changed since the state Reapportionment Act of i9oi, were allegedly unconstitutional
because of gross population disparities.1 47a Pending remedial action by the legislature, they sought a declaration of invalidity and an injunction against further use
of the i9oi Act. They requested a court order directing the defendants (members
of the State Board of Elections) to conduct the next legislative elections, both primary and general, at large. They also asserted the appropriateness of a court order
decreeing reapportionment by application of the Tennessee constitutional formulae
to the latest federal census figures.
Unlike many state constitutions, where apportionment formulae phrased in terms
of a population principle are engulfed by exceptions designed to achieve geographic
diffusion of political power, 48 the Tennessee Constitution's apportionment formula
puts few qualifications on its basic rule of numerical equality for both houses of the
legislature. The basic formula for each house is apportionment "among the several
counties or districts, according to the number of qualified voters in each."'14 Despite
this apparent embrace of the one-man-one-vote principle, population disparities
among Tennessee legislative districtsA'5 presented the same sorry picture as in most
other states. Counties having but thirty-seven per cent of the population elected
twenty of the thirty-three members of the state senate. Senatorial district population
varied from 131,971 to 25,190. Counties having but forty per cent of the population
elected sixty-three of the ninety-nine members of the lower house. The number
of voters in the representative districts varied from 42,298 to 2,340.
Political pressures and the abortive state court suit in I9565 ' had alike proven
ineffective either to impel the legislature to act or to accomplish reapportionment
directly by constitutional amendment. 52 Tennessee has no provision for popular
initiative. The legislature had not acted, nor could it be expected to act, either
to submit constitutional amendments on reapportionment to popular vote or to
include reapportionment in the call for a constitutional convention. As Judge Miller
had said in deciding that the complaint presented a case for a three-judge district
court, "if there is no judicial remedy there would appear to be no practical remedy
'1 3
at all."
1'

Record, pp. 14-16,

32-38, 126-16o

(documented Survey of Legislative Apportionment in Tennessee,

1870-1957), Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Brief for Appellants, pp. 14-15, Baker v. Carr, ibid.

'"'Plaintiffs also alleged discrimination by the Tennessee legislature against underrepresented counties
and in favor of the overrepresented in the collection and distribution of various taxes and tax revenues,
notably in the distribution of school and highway-improvement funds. The Court's disposition of the
case made specific treatment of these allegations unnecessary, but Justice Frankfurter excepted from his
general dissent the question whether such discriminations would violate the equal protection clause if the
tax statutes were challenged in a proper proceeding. Baker v. Carr supra note 145, at 298.
According to Brief for Appellants, pp. 5-12, in "round figures, statewide, a / minority of voters from
predominantly sparsely populated counties, select a % majority of both houses."
149 TENN. CoNSr. art. 2, §§ 5, 6.
...See chart III in Appendix.
.. Kidd v. McCanless, supra note 145.
"0 Record, supra note 147, at 25-31.

supra note 147; Brief of Appellants, supra note 147.
Baker v. Carr, 175 F. Supp. 649, 652 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).

" Record,
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B. Jurisdiction
On the question of jurisdiction it was sufficient for Justice Brennan that "the
matter set forth in the complaint does arise under the Constitution and is within 28
U.S.C. sec. 13 43 ,"15 vesting original jurisdiction of certain federal civil rights claims
in United States district courts. In short, a bare allegation of violation of the
fourteenth amendment surmounts the jurisdictional hurdle unless the claim is "so
attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,"' or is "frivolous."'1 5 Jurisdiction involves simply the power to look, without prejudging the
final outcome. As the Court had earlier said in Bell v.Hood:'1
Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a
question of law and just as issues of fact it must be decided after and not before the court
has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy. If the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief,
then dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want of jurisdiction.
Justice Harlan, dissenting, took issue with his colleagues on this threshold question. He argued that until it first be decided that the fourteenth amendment does
impose some restraint on apportionments of state legislatures there cannot even be a
colorable federal claim and hence no jurisdiction in a federal court."' Justice
Harlan's argument has plausibility if one bears in mind that in previous Supreme
Court cases there had not been the slightest intimation that the fourteenth amendment had this meaning. This fact sets the case apart from Bell v. Hood and others
relied on by the majority where the alleged federal standard was more familiar and
precise. But it really is a sort of chicken-and-egg argument.
If one also bears in mind that the Constitution is a dynamic document, capable
of taking on fresh meaning in new situations, it is obvious that from time to time
claims will be asserted which will not even be colorable federal claims until after
the Court adds the fresh, unprecedented meaning to the Constitution by accepting
and deciding the case. Should this process of constitutional development and refinement take place at the "jurisdictional" level, as Justice Harlan apparently would
have it, or at the level of trial on the "merits" as the Court would have it? Since
an issue of novel constitutional construction should not be decided in any event until
after the fullest possible presentation of fact and legal argument, the tidier approach
would seem to be that of the Court. Otherwise there would be something like a
pre-jurisdictional full trial of the essence of the case.
Consistency would also dictate that dismissal for failure to state a proper federal
cause of action should also be characterized as an exercise, not a denial, of jurisdiction.'59 The Court would be truncating the hearing, not denying power. And the
""' Baker v. Carr, supra note 145, at 199.

...Ibid., quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904).
.Ibid., quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 683 (1946).
157 327 U.S. 678, 682 (946).
15' Baker v. Carr, supra note 145, at 331.
Justice Frankfurter did not join Justice Harlan on this
point. Id. at 330.
139Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 683 (1946).
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dismissal would to some extent clarify the dimension of "federal rights"
action, as well as affirmative action, can have high didactic value.
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Negative

C. Standing
Perhaps the only simple aspect of the Baker case was the question of plaintiffs'
standing to litigate the alleged unconstitutionality of Tennessee's legislative districts
under the equal protection clause. As Professor Louis L. Jaffe has noted recently, a
direct interference with a citizen's franchise has been actionable as a private wrong
since 1703.G And going beyond personalized wrongs, courts "have intervened at
the suit of the citizen-voter to enforce a considerable part of the constitutional and
statutory code governing the election process."'' Smiley v. Holm and the other
"I932 cases"' 62 cited by Justice Brennan in his Opinion of the Courtltu are appropriate and indistinguishable precedents on the standing issue, even if inappropriate on
the justiciability issue. Under the assumption-which is a necessary assumption for
the purpose of determining standing-that Tennessee's districts produce a federally
cognizable injury, the Baker plaintiffs are among those who have sustained it.
The only troublesome prior Supreme Court language on the standing issue was
the comment in Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion in Colegrove v. Green in
which he said, inter alia, that the "basis for the suit is not a private wrong, but
a wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity."'6 4 However, the force of this language
was undercut within the Colegrove opinion itself because Justice Frankfurter also
discussed justiciability, which logically would not have to be reached if there were
no plaintiffs entitled to address the Court. It also was undercut either directly or
sub silentio in subsequent cases where the Court passed beyond standing to discuss
either justiciability or the merits.' 6 5 In his dissent in Baker Justice Frankfurter did
not repeat this language; nor did the other dissenter, Justice Harlan, discuss standing.
The Court's decision and remand in Baker did leave unresolved certain questions
regarding the sufficiency of the parties, particularly whether the county election commissioners were indispensable parties, and if so whether they were reached by naming
among the defendants the state Board of Elections as their representative'" 6
"'Jaffe, Standing to Secure judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 Hav. L. REV. 1265, 1297 (1961),
citing Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (Q.B. 1703).
'' Ibid.
x See discussion of Smiley and related 1932 cases in text supra at notes 89 et seq.
183 Baker v. Carr, supra note 145, at 206-08.
1.. Colegrove v. Green, supra note io6, at 552.
..8 E.g., MacDougall v. Green, supra note 116; South v. Peters, supra note X12.

2" The complaint had named as defendants the Tennessee Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the
Coordinator of Elections, and the members of the State Board of Elections. The Board members were

sued in their own right and also as representatives of the County Election Commissioners whom they
appoint.
On the other side of the case the Court had no trouble with the status of the initial plaintiffs, voterresidents in underrepresented districts, who sued on their own behalf and on behalf of all qualified voters
of their respective counties and all Tennessee voters similarly situated. The additional averment that
these plaintiffs were suing "on behalf of all other voters in the State" caused Justice Brennan to wonder
whether plaintiffs were also asserting that voters in counties allegedly overrepresented also have standing
to complain. However, he deemed it unnecessary to resolve this question. Baker v. Carr, supra note
145, at 2o5 n.24.
The Court also left unresolved the question whether the Mayor of Nashville and the cities of
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D. Justiciability

Yes!
There is a temptation to let this heading go with that one word. If there is
some merit in Justice Clark's flip observation that Justice Frankfurter's words "go
through so much and conclude with so little,"'18 there would be about equivalent
merit in an observation that the majority's words "go through so little and conclude
with so much."
Whether one agrees with or differs from Justice Frankfurter's negative conclusion
on justiciability-and the writer feels that he must disagree-Justice Frankfurter's
lengthy opinion, in this landmark case not marked by equally landmark opinions,
68
bears out his accolade of "scholar on the bench.'
The general approach of the full opinions on the majority side-Justice Brennan
for the Court, Justice Douglas, and Justice Clark' 0 9 -was to distinguish and explain
away the apparent contrary decisions or dicta of the past rather than to overrule
them. In the process they succeeded mainly in further muddying the already murky
waters of precedent. If the past was really so inconclusive and uncontrolling of the
issue in Baker v. Carr, then a great many commentators, lawyers and laymen alike,
had been led into needless worry and idle speculation. Wholly lacking from Baker
is the stark simplicity, and brevity, of Chief Justice Warren's statement in Brown v.
Board of Education that "We cannot turn the clock back ...we must consider
public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American
life throughout the Nation." 1 0 The lack of articulation in Baker of a "necessitychanging times" principle is all the more surprising in view of the major reversal of
very recent precedent which the decision represents.
(x) Justice Brennan. The tone of Justice Brennan's section on justiciability is set
in his first paragraph where he not only states that apportionment presents no
nonjusticiable political questions but also asserts that "cited cases do not hold the
contrary."'' The district court had "misinterpreted" the decisions of the Supreme
Court, including Colegrove, on which it relied.
He proceeded to analyze the political question doctrine under several headings:
past development of it in cases on matters other than voting and elections; its relation to and partial derivation from the separation of powers doctrine; its essence,
stated as a matter of affirmative definition." 2 He then devoted several pages to a
Chattanooga and Knoxville--permitted to intervene as parties plaintiff-had standing to sue as reprcsentatives of the residents of their respective jurisdictions. They pressed the same claims as the initial
plaintiffs. Id. at 204 n.23.
1"" Baker v. Carr, supra note 145, at 251.
...HELEN S. THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER, SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH (ig6o).
1"' Justice Stewart contributed a cautionary note, not a full opinion.
17 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).

t Baker v. Carr, supra note 145, at 209.

"'His summary of the elements of the political question category omits one crucial item-prospective
lack of an effective and enforceable remedy. He views the political question doctrine as "essentially
a function of the separation of powers." Elements include a "constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
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refutation of the argument that the Tennessee apportionment case was analogous
to the line of cases under the guarantee clause ("republican form of government")...

which traditionally had been classified-and properly, he would admit-as presenting
"political questions." It would have been helpful if he had devoted an equal amount
of space to an explicit analysis of the reasons why apportionment cases should
not likewise be classified as political questions even though they fall outside the
guarantee clause area, which after all is only a political question subheading.
Coming to the case at hand he gave hurried treatment to the prior federal

precedents relied on by the district court, in the course of which he mis-characterized
Smiley v. Holm1 4 and the other 1932 cases as having "settled the issue in favor of
justiciability of questions of congressional redistricting"'1 75 Actually, as noted earlier,

these cases only "settled the issue in favor of justiciability" of one type of question
concerning congressional redistricting, and a very narrow one at that. They concerned the applicability of the governor's veto power to a state redistricting statute
and did not raise at all the question of a substantive federal restraint on state weighting of voting strength among counties or districts' 76
Justice Brennan then concluded in favor of justiciability without ever reaching
the factors of vagueness regarding the possible federal standard and of dubiety
regarding possible remedies. 7 7 And yet these factors, more than abstractions about
separation of powers, provide much of the impetus for a political question classification. By remaining at a high level of abstraction in his discussion of "jurisdiction"
and in his discussion of "justiciability" he bypassed two opportunities for careful,
preliminary speculations concerning possibilities for solution of the critical standardremedy problem.
This is not to say that standards cannot be devised and remedies applied. It is
to suggest that the Court seems to have decided justiciability in such a generalized
context as to amount to judicial adventuring on the high seas of politics with
no assurance of a safe return to shore. One cannot help but feel that it was this
lack of a searching analysis of the possibilities regarding the federal standard and
federal remedies, as much as the actual decision, that upset Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan.
judicial discretion, or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question." Baker v. Carr, supra note 145, at 217.
"" U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 4. Justice Brennan's handling of the guarantee clause precedents has been
questioned in Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CALiF. L. REv. 245, 252 (x962): "Nevertheless, the net conclusion of his opinion seems to be

that the issue presented in Baker v. Carr is justiciable when presented under the equal protection clause,
but nonjusticiable when raised under the guarantee. This seems rather incongruous."
174 285 U.S. 355 (1932).

1" Baker v. Carr, supra note 145, at 232.

...See discussion in text supra at notes 89 et seq.

"" He did make one off-hand assertion that "judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause
arc well developed and familiar... " Baker v. Carr, supra note 145, at 226. Actually, apart from race,
the content of the equal protection clause has been uncertain and appeal to it has often been unsuccessful
as indicated in justice Holmes' reference to it as a "last refuge of constitutional argument." See generally
ROBERT J. HAMus, ThE QuEsTr FOR EQUALTY ( 960).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Justice Douglas. Justice Douglas already had spoken on the basic issue,1 s
and he hewed to his previous line. He made now no pretense of arguing that the
present majority result was what the Court had intended all along, except for a
cryptic footnote endorsing in general Justice Brennan's historical review." 9 The
main thrust of his opinion was to document the idea that in numerous cases in the
past federal courts have intervened to safeguard the voting rights"1 0 of individuals
against violence at the polls,' 81 discrimination on racial grounds,' 8 2 or slippery election practices.' 3 With these past cases few persons would disagree, and certainly not
Justice Frankfurter or Justice Harlan.'" But these precedents concerning judicial
action on particularized pleas of individual voters would seem to have little or no
relevance concerning weighting, through apportionment, of votes freely cast and
counted, unless an emotive righteousness, rather than reason, is to become the touchstone of judicial action.'8 8
(3) Justice Clark. Justice Clark was the only majority Justice who tried to come
to grips with the standard-remedy problem, on which ultimately political question
issues should turn, rather than on Justice Brennan's separation of powers abstractions.
On the justiciability issue itself he was content to rely largely on MacDougall v.
Green38 Reading it for all it was worth, and perhaps quite a bit more, he concluded
that the Court there had adjudicated an equal protection attack on the Illinois election
statute. The vagaries of the opinion in MacDougall, the fact that the Court left the
Illinois practice undisturbed, and the fact that the law involved conditions for forming
a new political party, not apportionment, did not disturb him.
On the question of what would flow from a holding of justiciability in Baker,
Justice Clark, like Justice Frankfurter, was unimpressed by the point so stressed
in the briefs and alluded to by Justice Douglas that a mere assertion of justiciability
very likely would cow the legislature and produce the desired reapportionment, so
that a federal standard would never have to be articulated or remedy devised. Because
the standard-remedy question replaces justiciability as the current issue, now that
(2)

1 8
7 E.g., his dissenting notes or opinions in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Colegrove v.
Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (I947); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948); South v. Peters, 339 U.S.

276

(i95o).
17' Baker v. Carr, supra note 145, at 241 n.i.

180

He constructs and documents this faulty syllogism: many claims about voting by individuals have
been treated as justiciable; this apportionment claim has some relation to voting; therefore this suit is
justiciable.

His major premise is not a "universal," and the class identified in the minor premise is not

clearly the same as the class covered by the major premise.
18'Ex parte Yarbrough, izo U.S. 651 (1884).

'182E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and other "white primary" cases.
"'E.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).

"8'Justice Frankfurter voted with the majority in both Smith v. Allwright, supra note x82, and
United States v. Classic, supra note x83.
""SFor an exposition of the Brandeis concern for facts, in the context of the contrasting modes of
operation of Justice Black-another judicial "liberal"-and Justice Frankfurter, see WAL.r.ACE MLNDRLsON,
JusrxcEs BLAcK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICr IN TIE COURT (196i).
1S6335 U.S. 281 (1948), discussed supra note 116.
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Baker has been decided, Justice Clark's detailed observations on it will be reserved
for separate treatment below.

(4)Justice Stewart. Justice Stewart did not write a full opinion. He did feel
moved to write a brief cautionary note on what the Court had done, and left undone
which would have been a helpful prefix to the opinion of the Court. He wanted to
make it clear that in bringing forth its roaring mouse of justiciability the Court had
left a little mountain of uncertainty on the merits and the remedy.
(5)Justice Frankjurter. It was to be expected that the "scholar on the bench"
would produce an exhaustive analysis commensurate with the landmark dimensions
of the case. He gave full measure. He did not deign to analyze the cavils and
quiddities by which counsel had sought to distinguish some of the precedent cases.
But he felt that no amount of paralogy would serve to distinguish Colegrove v.
Barrett,87 the challenge in federal district court to Illinois state legislature districts
8 which was a "precisely
which was on "all fours" with Baker, or Kidd v. McCanless,"'
similar attack" to the Tennessee state legislative districts started in state court' 8 9
He then embarked on a review of the general nature of "political questions," as
revealed in American judicial history over several decades.
In professorial manner he chided those who fail to note "the danger of conceptions of 'justiciability' derived from talk and not from the effective decision in a
case."'10 He found that judicial use of the "political question" label, as a ground
for non-intervention, had been the product of several converging considerations: a
spirit of caution where "standards meet for judicial judgment" are lacking; reluctance
to "interfere with matters of state government" unless an unquestionable constitutional mandate such as the one against racial discrimination is present; unwillingness to make courts "arbiters of the broad issues of political organization historically
committed to other institutions and for whose adjustment the judicial process is illadapted."'' All of these considerations explained the consistent line of decisions
92
holding nonjusticiable claims based on the guarantee clause.'
For example, in Luther v. Borden,"9 in addition to concern over the delicacy
of judicial intervention into the very structure of government, the absence of guiding
standards for judgment was critical: "... the question whether the Dorr constitution
had been rightfully adopted depended, in part, upon the extent of the franchise
to be recognized-the very point of contention over which rebellion had been
fought."'4
The relevance of this background to the case.before him was that Baker involved
all of the elements that make guarantee clause cases nonjusticiable. In effect, Baker
is "a guarantee clause claim masquerading under a different label."' 95 And, he
187330 U.S. 804 (1948).

is 352 U.S. 920 (1956).

s Baker v. Carr, supra note 145, at 280.
... E.g., Smiley v. Holm and related cases, supra notes 89 etseq., particularly note 104.
"" Baker v. Carr, supra note 145, at 289.
In 48 U.S. (7 How.) z (1849).
"" Id. at 297.

"9" U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, S 4.

...Baker v. Carr, supra 145, at 295.

Bonfield, supra note 173, expressing the contrary view, seems to place undue weight on
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insisted, the fact that the equal protection label was used did not strengthen one whit
the case for justiciability.
The equal protection label fails to help despite the fact that at first blush a charge
of discrimination gives "the appearance of more private, less impersonal claim, than
the assertion that the frame of government is askew."19 The reason is that the
resolution of an equal protection challenge to legislative apportionment ultimately and
unavoidably involves a choice among competing theories of political philosophy.
What, then, is this question of legislative apportionment? Appellants invoke the right
to vote and to have their votes counted. But they are permitted to vote and their votes
are counted. They go to the polls, they cast their ballots, they send their representatives to
the state councils. Their complaint is simply that the representatives are not sufficiently
numerous or powerful-in short, that Tennessee has adopted a basis of representation
with which they are dissatisfied. Talk of "debasement" or "dilution" is circular talk.
One cannot speak of "debasement" or "dilution" of the value of a vote until there is first
defined a standard of reference as to what a vote should be worth. What is actually asked
of the Court in this case is to choose among competing bases of representation-ultimately,
really, among competing theories of political philosophy-in order to establish an appropriate frame of government for the State of Tennessee and thereby for all the States of the

Union.

97

Justice Frankfurter then proceeded to place the claim in the perspective of history
by surveying the actual practices in regard to legislative apportionment and districting in Great Britain, the colonies, the states at the time of the formation of the
Constitution, the states during the nineteenth century including apportionment practices at the time of ratification of the fourteenth amendment, and the contemporary
scene. The thought that emerges from this twenty-page survey is that although concern has often been expressed over apportionments grossly malproportioned to popu-

lation, the generally prevailing feature-if any one feature can be singled out from
the numerous widely varying principles and practices--"is geographic inequality in
198
relation to the population standard.'

Justice Frankfurter then concluded his sixty-three page dissent by brushing aside
the argument that the federal courts could ease the problem of lack of an adequate
guiding standard-and thus ease one worry about results of a finding of justiciability
-by simply putting the force of the fourteenth amendment behind the apportionment
formulae specified in the Tennessee State Constitution. For, as the Court had said
much earlier: "Settled state practice ... can establish what is state law.... Deeply
embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy, such as those of which
petitioner complains, are often tougher and truer law than the dead words of the
written text."'. 9 From the standpoint of a federal constitutional plea in Baker,
the distinction between those schemes of "malapportionment" which are sanctioned by state law and
those--as in Baker-which are contrary to state law. He classifies the former as being within the
guarantee clause, the latter as being outside the clause.
196
Id. at 298-99.
' T Id. at 299-300.
"Id. at 321.
"° Id. at 326, quoting from Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (5940).
For Justice Harlan also this argument based on the Tennessee Constitution was "manifestly untenable."
Id. at 332.
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the "law" of Tennessee is the actual practice of the past sixty years, not the longignored formal commands of the,Tennessee Constitution. So the question remains,
given the clear and easily proven "law-practice" of Tennessee regarding reapportionment, does it violate any federal standard?
(6) Justice Harlan. Justice Harlan concurred in Justice Frankfurter's exhaustive
treatment of the justiciability issue and in turn was joined by Justice Frankfurter
in his separate dissenting opinion. The separate Harlan opinion, like the opinion
of Justice Clark on the majority side, was devoted primarily to the standard-remedy
question, except for Justice Harlan's opening caveat on the "jurisdiction" issue already discussed.
It was quite clear to him that the equal protection clause did not require that
"each vote cast in state legislative elections be given approximately equal weight."2 '
Short of that, he was satisfied, too, that the Tennessee apportionment did not offend
equal protection by being "so unreasonable as to amount to an arbitrary and capricious act of classification."' 0' He also put his finger on what emerges ever more
clearly as the nub of the matter, the more one reads the opinions in Baker. The
underlying and largely unexpressed premise of the majority and concurring opinions
was a sort of necessity principle:

20

The fact that the appellants have been unable to obtain political redress of their asserted
grievances appears to be regarded as a matter which should lead the Court to stretch to
find some basis for judicial intervention. While the Equal Protection Clause is invoked,
the opinion for the Court notably eschews explaining how, consonant with past decisions,
the undisputed facts in this case can be considered to show a violation of that constitutional
provision.
Although Justice Harlan's remarks were placed in the context of reinforcing
the conclusion of nonjusticiability by showing the great difficulty of relating the
equal protection clause to legislative apportionment, his opinion also approached
the merits. It amounted to a holding that on facts like those alleged in the Baker
complaint and supporting exhibits no violation of equal protection could be
shown. To this major and unresolved question of a federal standard for state legislative apportionment, and the related problem of possible remedies, it is now time to
turn.
IV
Is TFMa A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF FAIR REPRESENTATION?
It is apparent that the express congressional power of apportionment of the House
of Representatives, as augmented by the power of each house to control its own membership, would support a broad congressional power to review state practices in
regard to formation of congressional districts °3 That Congress has not chosen to
200 Ibid.
3

U.S. CoNsr. art. I, §§ 2, 5.

notes 140-41.

202

1d. at 339.
Regarding congressional inaction, in practice, see text supra at

201Ibid.
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be active in this field, and that neither the Congress nor the courts enforced such
statutory districting standards as *did exist in the past, is a matter of history.
In regard to apportionment and districting of state legislatures some congressional
power conceivably may derive from the authority of Congress to implement the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, but it has not been asserted. 4 Hence, the
primary bases for federal challenge to substantive aspects of state apportionment
and districting of state legislatures-or state arrangements of congressional districtshave been those constitutional commands which are self-executing, ie., judicially
enforceable without need for implementing statutes. The two leading candidates for
the honor of supporting judicial intervention have been the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, particularly the latter which underlies Baker v. Carr.20 5
A. Judicial History of Equal Protection
Once the precedents concerning application of the equal protection clause to statesupported or state-permitted racial discrimination are laid aside-and Baker v. Carr
is not a race discrimination case-the meaning of equal protection becomes quite

elusive.20 6 Justice Holmes, with an aptness not wholly out of date today, has char20 7
acterized the clause as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments."

Non-racial applications of the equal protection clause, as identified in a recent
work by Professor Robert Harris,"' can be grouped under five major headings: (x)

as a barrier to state economic legislation, i.e., regulation or taxation; (2) as a restraint
on legislative discriminations in favor of or against women; (3)as a restraint on
certain political processes including alleged malapportionment; (4) as a device to
mitigate the handicap of poverty in appealing criminal convictions; and (5)some
miscellaneous matters of no general import. Baker v.Carr, when finally resolved,
may invigorate the "political processes" category in this list. As to the others, with
...The route of federal constitutional amendment, to assure equitable representation in state legislatures, was suggested by Senator Clark of Pennsylvania in 196o. S.J. Res. 215, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
(196o); io6 CONG. REc. 14901 (ig6o). Because state legislatures themselves are involved in the federal
amending process, either by directly ratifying or by setting up ratifying conventions, the proposal obviously
was made more for political effect than in expectation of accomplishment.
"'See discussion of earlier cases, text supra notes 39 et seq. and to6 et seq.
...The "central core of the equal protection clause [is] its application to discrimination based on
race or color and the power of Congress and the federal courts to condemn them." RoarBR J. HAMuus,
TIE QuEs" FOR EQUALITY 82 (5960).
Racial applications of the equal protection clause become obscure at the frontier of the "state action"
concept. "In deciding whether certain nominally 'private' arrangements have such an effect as to be
within the interdiction of the fourteenth amendment, the basic question is the degree of the adverse
effect on racial equality of opportunity rather than 'state action' per se. State action at least of a
technical sort is almost ever-present. These border-line determinations will require a more refined concept
of equality itself, in'
the context of the needs of a free and open society. The frontier of equal protection
[in race cases] lies in such areas as the Girard Trust case in regard to discriminatory provisions in
charitable trusts, in quasi-private publicly-assisted housing, and in quasi-private government contract employment." Dixon, Book Review, 29 Gao. WAsH. L. Rnv. 817, 823, (196).
" Buck v. Bell 274 U.S. 200, 2o8 (1927).
2u'Harris, op. cit. supra note 2o6, ch. 3 generally.
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the exception of criminal appeals under the Griffin doctrine," 9 the reaction of the
Court to those who have invoked the clause has been mixed or negative.
Three of these five categories, the economic legislation category-which produced

three-fourths of the cases,2 10 the criminal appeals category, and the political processes
category, contain possibly significant sources for enlightenment in handling the

equal protection plea in Baker v. Carr. The remaining two categories principally
provide small cases, often mixed with humor. It has always been difficult for the
law to take seriously the claims of women for equality. There was a fifty year gap,
which some might dub a cultural lag, between the fifteenth amendment and the
nineteenth amendment regarding voting by Negro men, and by women, respectively.

Among judges, as revealed by the case law, Professor Harris finds "an almost josephic
aversion to women." 211 In a relatively recent pronouncement sustaining a Michigan

statute forbidding licensing of female bartenders, but containing an exception in
favor of the wife or daughter of the male bar owner, Justice Frankfurter recalled
"the alewife, sprightly and ribald, in Shakespeare, 12 and said ?13
The fact that women now have achieved virtues that men have long claimed as their
prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude
the states from drawing a sharp line between the sexes, certainly in such matters as the
regulation of the liquor traffic.

(i) Criminal Pauper Appeals. The rules regarding criminal pauper appeals
developed since 1956 represent one of the newer frontiers of the law. But it is not
clear whether the rules are properly classifiable as a frontier of equal protection, as
the Court seems to have done, or as a frontier of due process, which Justice Harlan
in his dissent to the leading case, Griffin v.Illinois,14 would have thought more
logical. In Griffin the Court reversed, 5-4, an Illinois conviction of two armed
robbers who had been unable to appeal because they lacked money for a trial
transcript and could not qualify under two free transcript provisos2 15
Of course, the components of the alleged inequity are quite different in the
Griffin line of cases and in legislative apportionment. Apportionment involves'
...
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); see text infra notes 214 et seq.
2%oIn terms of numbers, Professor Harris found that of 554 decisions of the Supreme Court in which the
equal protection clause had been invoked, three-fourths dealt with economic interests, i.e., state regulation
and taxation, and only fifteen per cent dealt with racial discrimination. That non-racial cases have made
up the bulk of litigation under the equal protection clause, at least in terms of numbers of cases, illustrates
once again how a legal rule developed for one problem will be utilized in a major way in an unintended,
or at 1least unexpected, field. HARi s, op. cit. supra note 2o6, at 59.
" Id. at 73.
12
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948).
215
Id. at 466.
214 351 U.S. 12, 36 (1956).
= Both the opinion of the Court by Justice Black and the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter
seemed to rest essentially on the apparent disparity, in the operation of the state rule, between those who
could afford an appeal and those who could not.
Jutice Frankfurter was the more explicit of the two in noting that the Constitution forbids "differentiations by a state that have no relation to a rational policy of criminal appeal." Id. at 22. This is equal
protection language. But he also went on to say that the Constitution forbids "the imposition of conditions
that offend the deepest presuppositions of 6ur society." -Ibid. This is due process language, implying
an absolute restraint on governmental power rather than one keyed to differential treatment.
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alleged state-created inequities in weighting of votes. Criminal pauper appeals turn
on the question of the extent to which states are under an affirmative obligation to
shape their rules so as to minimize the effect of such natural differences as relative
wealth. Griffin conveys the idea that states are under a constitutional duty to insure
that poverty-which is not itself a state-created differentiating condition-does not
nevertheless, in practice, become a differentiating condition affecting capacity to take
advantage of the general privilege of obtaining review of a criminal conviction.
But Griffin does not articulate a principle to measure the sweep of this new "equal
protection" rule regarding poverty. If mere poverty-influenced differences in capacity
to enjoy opportunities offered by the state render a state's program unconstitutional, then tuition would have to be abolished in state universities and necessitous
public school students would have to be provided with state sustenance so that they
could complete their education. The social interest in education would appear to be
as deep as the interest in equitable criminal procedures.
The relevance of Griffin to legislative apportionment lies in its illustration of a
tendency to decide "equal protection" cases without ever clearly identifying the
aspect of the particular discriminatory effect which makes it also "unreasonable,"
"invidious," and hence unconstitutional. The essence of a successful equal protection
plea, outside the field of race, is a showing not merely of "discrimination" or differential treatment, but a showing that the "discrimination" or differential treatment
derives from an unreasonable classification.
This vagueness in Griffin in 1956 on the substantive meaning of equal protection
troubled Justice Harlan, and his reaction presaged his opinion years later in Baker v.
Carr, where he and Justice Clark were the only ones to try to come to grips with the
essential meaning of equal protection. In his Griffin dissent he felt that a simplistic
equal protection approach, focused essentially on the differentiating factor of poverty,
ignored the real issue of why poverty would be an impermissible conditioning
factor in criminal appeals but-for the present at least-a permissible conditioning
factor in access to a state university. He did not see how poverty as a classifying
factor could have one meaning in one equal protection case and a different meaning
in another. The answer, he felt, was to recognize Griffin as not an equal protection
case at all but as a due process case involving a particular, identifiable, and relatively
narrow concept of fundamental fairness regarding criminal appeals. He said :210
. .. the issue here is not the typical equal protection question of reasonableness of a "classification" on the basis of which the State has imposed legal disabilities, but rather the
reasonableness of the State's failure to remove natural disabilities. The Court holds that
the failure of the State to do so is constitutionally unreasonable in this case although it
might not be in others. I submit that the basis for that holding is simply an unarticulated
conclusion that it violates "fundamental fairness" for a State which provides for appellate
review, and thus apparently considers such review necessary to assure justice, not to see
to it that such appeals are in fact available to those it would imprison for serious crimes.
That of course is the traditional language of due process ... and I see no reason to import
.16 Id. at 35-36.
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new substance into the concept of equal protection to dispose of the case, especially when
to do so gives rise to the all-too-easy opportunity to ignore the real issue and solve the
problems simply by labelling the Illinois practice as invidious "discrimination."
A prime virtue of the due process approach is that it allows the Court to police
the outer boundaries of governmental action, correcting particularly egregious
conduct and legislative excrescences, without getting into the detailed process of
equating group with group. Legislative apportionment cases have been fought
typically as equal protection cases. The time may come, however, when this more
generalized due process approach, with its protential avoidance of the details of
districting, may appear to be a more judicially workable approach than the equal
protection approach.
(2) Equal Protection and Political Processes. Prior to Baker v. Carr, the Colegrove precedent ruled the legislative apportionment field. There was one case,
however, as yet neither reversed nor dearly modified, which bears significantly on
the question of the application of the equal protection clause to alleged malapportionment. In Snowden v. Hughes"1 the Court stated the basic premise that it takes
more than a denial of a right conferred by state law to constitute a violation of equal
protection, "even though the denial of the right to one person may operate to confer
it on another." '
It then stated the following oft-quoted rule:21"
The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in
its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal
protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful
discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person . . . or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design to favor one individual or class over another not to be inferred from
there must be
the action itself.... But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed ...
a showing of "clear and intentional discrimination:'
As applied to the Snouwden facts this meant that the action was dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action. The petitioner did not allege that what was done
to him-refusal to certify him as a nominee for the Illinois legislature even though
he had received sufficient votes-was done so that somebody else could obtain the
nomination, or that somebody else in fact did obtain the nomination to the particular
office to which Snowden was entitled. There were two nominations to be made,
under a prior political party agreement, and Snowden, who ran second, was therefore
entitled to one of the nominations. The fact that the candidate who ran first was
certified by the Canvassing Board as one of the nominees was immaterial because
his relationship was to a different "office" than the one improperly denied to
Snowden.
Other language of the Court in this case leaves some uncertainty concerning the
essence of an equal protection claim, and what must be alleged to constitute a cause
of action. It is clear that A does not show an equal protection cause of action
217 321 U.S.

1

(1944).

"I, Id. at 8.

ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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merely, by showing wrongful treatment of himself at the hands of the state. Would
it be sufficient for A to allege, additionally, that the injurious treatment of him was
motivated by a desire to render different treatment, in relation to this same matter,

to B, which desire was effectuated? Would this constitute, in the Court's words,
"intentional or purposeful discrimination"? In particular, in the Snowden situation,
would the defect in the complaint have been cured merely by adding that the
nomination was given, instead, to Mr. X? If Snowden were rejected and X certified
on the ground that Snowden unlike X was a member of a disfavored racial or
religious minority, all might agree that this stated a good cause of action. But
suppose Snowden and X were both white Presbyterians and the Canvassing Board's
action was allegedly motivated by (a) personal animosity,"' or (b) a feeling that
Snowden, unlike X, was a party wrecker, or (c) a feeling that Snowden was too
old and ill and would not live out the term, or (d) a feeling that Snowden, unlike
X, was too uneducated for the position. Assuming that each of these actions would
be wrongful, would they also constitute an equal protection cause of action in the
light of the Court's admonition in the Snowden opinion that a "construction of the
equal protection clause which would find a violation of a federal right in every
departure by state officers from state law is not to be favored" 221
In its relation to legislative apportionment Snowden at least seems to indicate
that there must be a showing not merely of population disparity among districts, but
proof of a conscious scheme to have disparity of a particular kind, e.g., urban-rural,
and accomplishment of that scheme in that Group A actually received what Group
B was entitled to. But there is still further complexity in building from Snowdenor the Snowden dicta as to what would constitute a good cause of action-to legislative apportionment.
Suppose that A alleges different treatment of himself and B in relation to the
same matter, but neither mode of treatment taken by itself is a violation of state law,
unlike the Snowden situation. The typical legislative apportionment case would
seem to fall in this category. Does mere difference in treatment, in some situations,
constitute a violation of equal protection? The Court in Snowden spoke of "unequal
application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, '22 2 as being a component
of the claim, although not enough in itself. But who are entitled to equal treatment?
Is this an independent federal question?
The foregoing analysis suggests that at bottom the content of the state action is
the crucial thing. What is required is not just a showing of differential treatment
but the making of a distinction between permissible and impermissible governmental
purposes. And this seems to sound more in due process than equal protection.
At this point, has the Court opened a new door to judicial re-evaluation of substantive legislative purposes? Will it recreate the broad judicial discretion which
2.

Cf.

Burt. v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 79,

280 (9th Cir. 1959).
...Snowden v. Hughes, supra note 227, at 11-12.

1. Id.at 8.

(2d Cir. 1946); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.ad
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figured so prominently in the actions of the pre-i937 Court in measuring state
economic legislation by judicial concepts of due process?
(3) State Regulation and Taxation. Although cases like Morey v. Doud 23 and
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.224 continue to arise and find their way into the casebooks, such life and verve as this category ever possessed largely expired with
the I93O's. In the economic field the test has come to be not the existence of discrimination but the reasonableness of the statutory scheme of classification. The
"rules," as codified by Justice Van Devanter in 9io and oft-repeated since, are:? 5
(I) equal protection permits classification, i.e., discrimination, if the classification is
reasonable and not purely arbitrary; (2) an apparently reasonable classification is
not invalidated because lacking in mathematical nicety or productive of some inequality;226 (3) if facts making a classification reasonable can be conceived, their
existence at the time of enactment must be assumed; 227 (4) the one who challenges
a classification formula has the burden of showing it has no reasonable basis and is
essentially arbitrary.
Aided doubtless by the fourth rule allocating the burden of proof to the assailant
of the economic legislation, the Court more often rejected than'sustained the challenge. But a presumption of constitutionality does not serve to explain the cases
where the Court sustained the challenge, and if one searches the cases for elucidation of principles as to the limits of the presumption of constitutionality he will
meet only disappointment. In Morey v. Doud,2 s for example, the Court split sixthree against the constitutionality of an Illinois statute requiring all firms issuing
and selling money orders to obtain a license, but exempting the American Express
Company.
Neither the reason for the decision nor the cause of the split in the Court is well
explained in the decisions. It is hardly satisfying to revert to the second rule listed
above and simply say that equal protection is not a matter of mathematical nicety so
that the Court has what Justice Holmes called "sovereign prerogative of choice." With
such vagueness should not statutes be sustained under the normal judicial review
postulate of a presumption of constitutionality? Or should the facts rule, yielding
varying sets of presumptions? For example, should the presumption of constitutionality be balanced with a presumption of unconstitutionality where, as in Morey,
it is alleged that the statute favors the big company against the small companies?
The opinions in the cases indicate that the game of presumptions-made all the more
interesting by keeping them hidden-can be played on an especially rich field in
regard to equal protection. Possibilities include a presumption for a competitive,
25 354 U.s. 457 (1957).
224 348 U.S. 483 ('955).
.. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 22o U.S. 61, 78.79 (i951), quoted approvingly in Morey

v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-64 (959).
Because civil rights-equal protection cases are notable by their
failure to discuss equal protection at length, other areas must be appealed to for guidance regarding
the standard created by the clause.
"" Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527-28 (1959), citing intervening authorities.
117McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (g6i), citing intervening authorities.
228 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
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open market,2" a presumption for small as against big business, and a presumption
for a national concern against the favored local concern.
B. Apportionment Standards: The Clark-Harlan Discussion
Both the original raison d'etre and the recent judicial heyday of equal protection
have been its use to implement the one clear purpose of the Civil War Amendmentsincorporation of the Negro into the body politic2 ° These racial cases, perhaps more
than all the others, provided an important part of the backdrop against which Justices
Clark and Harlan, in their concurring and dissenting opinions respectively in Baker
v. Carr, worked out their thoughts on the application or non-application of equal
protection to apportionment. Indeed, the district court judge in the Hawaiian
apportionment case in 1956 made explicit reference to the egalitarian thrust of the
race cases in support of his announced decision-never implemented-to grant the
relief requested.2 3'
And yet, of all the past precedents from which enlightenment on the substantive
meaning of equal protection may be sought for the purpose of solving the apportionment issue, probably none are less helpful or relevant than the race cases. Race is by
definition a black and white matter. The constitutional command was explicitly
shaped with the freed Negro in mind. Apportionment, however, becomes a woefully fuzzy matter when one goes beyond the one-man-one-vote slogan and identifies
the many other elements which have some rightful or plausible appeal to enter
into the structuring of consent and leadership, of responsiveness and responsibility, of
majoritarianism and representativeness, of concentration and diffusion of political
power.
(i) Justice Clark. Justice Clark was prepared to decide the merits on the basis of
the undisputed facts in the record and to conclude that "the Tennessee apportionment statute offends the Equal Protection clause."232 Indeed, he suggested that the
majority had so held, "at least sub silentio,"'3 and thought it unfortunate that there
was a remand to the district court "for it to make what is certain to be that formal
determination."2 4
The content of Justice Clark's federal standard, which Tennessee had violated, is
not easily deduced from his opinion. On the one hand, it is clear, as he himself
stated, that he rejected the idea that "numerical equality of representation throughout a State is constitutionally required. 23 5 On the other hand it is not clear that
""Allied Stores v. Bowers, supra note 226.
"'Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67-72 (1873).

"We do not say that no one else

but the negro can share in this protection.... But what we do say, and what we wish to be understood
is, that in any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these amendments, it is necessary to
look to the purpose which we have said was the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they
were designed to remedy, and the process of continued addition to the Constitution, until that purpose
was supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law can accomplish it." Id. at 72.
"'1Dyer v. Kazubisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220, 236 (D. Hawaii 1956), discussed in text supra notes
52-62.

..Baker
83

v. Carr,-369 US. 186, 258 (1962).
234 Ibid.
Id.at 26T.

25

a Id.at 26o.
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he even found a constitutional mandate to recognize population factors in devising
an apportionment formula for either house of the legislature. His reason for discussing county population figures so much in his opinion was not to evaluate compliance
with some federal mandate phrased in population terms. Rather it was to explore
one possible basis for concluding that Tennessee's arrangement of state legislative
districts did comply with a federal mandate that state classification for any given
governmental activity or function be done under an identifiable and intelligible
principle-whether formally announced or not-consistently applied. Because
Tennessee's state constitution itself called for an apportionment formula primarily
based on population, and because numerical equality of representation was the
only apparent principle that Tennessee may have tried to follow, he did not have to
reveal his thoughts on the constitutionality of a county equality principle, consistently
followed, for one or both houses of the legislature.
The essence of his position in this case seems to be that "invidious discrimination," i.e., discrimination of the kind constitutionally forbidden, exists when two
factors are shown: first, that a "classification" pattern exists in regard to a particular
governmental activity or function, whether formally announced or not; and second,
that the classification pattern has no underlying rational, ordering principle, consistently followed. He does not dearly identify the "class" in Tennessee's pattern of
classification but he seems to be thinking of the county as the building block in the
state's apportionment system. Some counties, as grouped into legislative districts,
have more than one representative. Others, as similarly grouped, have a fractional
representative. But there seemed to be no rational principle, in terms of population
size or any other factor, which determined that a given county was in a "class" having
a fractional representative, while another county was in a "class" having more than
one representative.
He spoke of Tennessee's apportionment as "a topsy-turvical of gigantic proportions""" and as "a crazy quilt without rational basis."2 "T The evidence did not
even show a conscious "attempt to effect a rural-urban political balance" 238 by underrepresenting all urban counties and overrepresenting all rural counties. Taking a
population of io,ooo as a break point, tabulations showed that among "rural" counties
of less than io,ooo population there were significant disparities in representation.
Similarly, among "urban" counties of more than io,ooo population there were significant disparities.
Justice Clark's equal protection standard as formulated for this case has the appeal
of simplicity, would provide a basis for deciding the case-setting aside for the
moment the question of remedy-and would leave maximum room for state discretion in deciding what rational policy consistently to follow. Close scrutiny, however,
reveals that it is an incomplete, if not defective, formulation of an equal protection
standard. The general thrust of his opinion, and his use of the terms "topsy-turvical"
and "crazy quilt without a rational basis," indicate that he is using the term "ra2" Id. at

254.

237

Ibid.

"' Id. at

255.
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tional" simply in the sense of "intelligible." What, then, of the case where there
is a rational-in the sense of intelligible--ordering principle, which is consistently
followed, but which is in itself intrinsically unreasonable? That, precisely, was
Brown v. Board of Educationys9 and the Court held unconstitutional the resultant
racial segregation in the public schools. Can Justice Clark's formulation of the equal
protection standard be rounded out and perfected simply by adding the additional
factor that the rational policy, consistently followed in setting up the classification
pattern, must also be "reasonable"? Since "reasonableness" is the language of due
process this would link the two clauses"°-due process and equal protection-and
provide two levels of unconstitutionality: the first, where there is no rational plan
at all; the second, where the rationalizing or ordering principle offends a fundamental
sense of fairness, decency, and justice.
The Court will be pushed to consider this second level of unconstitutionality in
any apportionment case where the apportionment is under a rational policy-which
Justice Clark did not find in Tennessee-of county equality or of consistent underrepresentation of urban counties and overrepresentation of rural counties. What
then will be the content of the standard of unreasonableness? In Griffin v. Illinois241
the fact of poverty was deemed to be an unreasonable basis for denying appeals to
pauper defendants who could not afford a trial transcript, while allowing appeals
to defendants who differed only in being able to afford a trial transcript.
In the context of legislative apportionment, it is obvious that the conclusion of
"reasonableness" or "unreasonableness" will be influenced mightily by the manner
in which the burden of proof on the issue is allocated, and by the manner in which
presumptions are handled. These are the factors which seem to explain the split in
Baker v. Carr between Justices Clark and Harlan.
Both start from the premise that the constitution does not require the one-manone-vote principle. But Justice Clark then takes the obvious mathematical disparity
between urban counties of similar size, inter se, and rural counties of similar
size, inter se, as warranting the placing of the burden on the state, as the causative
force, for showing that the disparity rests on a rational-and perhaps also intrinsically
reasonable--classifying principle. Justice Harlan looks at the same figures but is not
fazed because he places on the plaintiffs the burden of showing that the obvious
population disparity is not simply the product of "all other factors justifying a legislative determination of the sort involved in devising a proper apportionment of
State Legislatures."2' 42 And he might have added that under the Snowden v. Hughes
principle there additionally should be proof of "an element
of intentional or purpose2 4 not just a showing of differences.2 44
ful discrimination,""
289347 U.S. 483 (1954).
240 Compare Boyd v. United States, xx6 U.S. 616 (x886),

linking the fourth and fifth amendments

in certain situations, relied on by Justice Black in his concurring opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(ig6i).
241 35r U.S.

12 (1956).

"4 Baker v. Carr, supra note 232, at 341 (Appendix to Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion).
248321 U.S. r, 8 (1944).
-" Justice Harlan's view of the relevance of statistics is further elaborated in the appendix to his dis-
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(z) The Presumptions-Burdenof Proof Game. Regarding this vital question of
burden of proof, so strikingly illustrated in the contrasting approaches of Justices
Clark and Harlan, a comparison of Baker with the "all-white jury '245 cases where presumptions also played a major role, is instructive. The premise in the "all-white jury"
cases that "all-white juries" are not illegal per se, and hence are not grounds in themselves for reversal of convictions of Negro defendants, is analogous to the ClarkHarlan premise that absolute numerical equality of representation throughout a state
is not constitutionally required. The premise in the jury cases is qualified by the rule
that continued existence of all-white juries over a time period creates a presumption
that the absence of Negroes does not result solely from the operation of legitimate
-i.e., racially neutral-selection factors. This qualifying rule has its analogy in
Justice Clark's view, not shared by Justice Harlan, that continued population disparities raise a presumption that an illegitimate classifying factor is operating. The
effect of the presumption in either instance is to put the burden on the state to show
absence of improper classification factors.
But the analogy is incomplete. Racial motivation is the illegitimate hidden factor
in the jury cases, which the Court reaches by means of the presumption after proof
of absence of Negroes in the jury panel. What is the illegitimate hidden factor in
the Tennessee apportionment case, which the Court reaches by means of presumption
after proof of population disparities among districts? "... aye, there's the rub," as
Justice Frankfurter exclaimed. 46
Race not being involved, there remain two other possible illegitimate hidden
factors in the apportionment situation. First, the Court could create a basic rule, as
a matter of constitutional law, that the constitution requires numerical equality in
representation, unless intrinsically reasonable and consistently used grounds for deviation can be shown. Second, the Court could create a constitutional rule that apportionment must be done under some intelligible and consistently used formula, without pre-judging at all the question of the role that population or other factors should
play in the formula. Although the general thrust of Justice Clark's opinion seems
to point in the direction of the second of these two approaches, his closing peroration
2 47
on representative government suggests identification with the first approach.
senting opinion: "The fault with a purely statistical approach to the case at hand lies not with the
particular mathematical formula used, but in the failure to take account of the fact that a multitude
of legitimate legislative policies, along with circumstances of geography and demography, could account
for the seeming electoral disparities among counties. The principles set out in the Tennessee Constitution
are just some of those that were deemed significant. Others may have been considered and accepted
by those entrusted with the responsibility for Tennessee's apportionment. And for the purpose
of judging constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause it must be remembered that what is controlling on the issue of 'rationality' is not what the State Legislature may actually have considered but
what it may be deemed to have considered." Baker v. Carr, supra note 232, at 345.
'"The leading case is Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), where evidence was adduced that
no Negro had ever been known to serve on any jury, and that there were Negroes who satisfied the legal
qualifications. See also Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947), regarding "duty of the State to try
to justify" the exclusion where it had continued over several years.
'"Baker v. Carr, supra note 232, at 269.
2 Although Justice Clark does allude to the noncompliance with Tennessee's own state constitution,
id. at 254, he does not seem to dispute the Frankfurter-Harlan observation that it has no relevance
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(3)Justice Harlan. Part of Justice Harlan's discussion of the "standard" issue was
devoted to rejection of any thought that the fourteenth amendment commands that
each vote have approximately equal weight. On this point, as already seen, Justice
Clark is in agreement. The remainder of his dissent was devoted to a rejection of
the idea, which was part of Justice Clark's thesis, that Tennessee's apportionment
system had no rhyme or reason and was a mere "capricious classification of voting
'2 8
strength"
Implicit in this part of his opinion and his supporting Appendix seemed to be the
idea that an apportionment which was merely a "capricious classification" would,
without more, be a constitutional violation without need to specify any affirmative
constitutional requirements regarding relative share of voting strength to which particular persons or groups might be entitled. This view is supported by the phrasing
of this question by Justice Harlan: "What then is the basis for the claim made in
this case that the distribution of state senators and representatives is the product of
capriciousnessor of some constitutionallyprohibited policy?" 24" Accordingly, Justice
Harlan would differ from Justice Clark mainly on the facts, on this branch of
the case.
It was also quite clear that if a state's apportionment cleared the "capriciousness"
hurdle, Justice Harlan would be at a loss to see how the fourteenth amendment imposed any limitations-apart from such familiar categories as race and religion-on
the state's discretion in selecting and utilizing apportionment factors. "Surely," he
felt, "it lies within the province of a state legislature to conclude that an existing
allocation of senators and representatives constitutes a desirable balance of geographical and demographical representation, or that in the interest of stability of
government it would be best to defer for some further time the redistribution of seats
in the state legislature."'
He noted Justice Stewart's disclaimer that the majority
opinion contained any suggestion that the Federal Constitution commands any particular kind of legislative apportionment, or that it commands according to each
voter approximately equal electoral strength. Having thus disposed both of the
capriciousness argument and the possibility of violation of any more intrinsic
standard, he found nothing left of the complaint.
V
PosT-BAxrM v. CARR CASES: QUEST FOR A STANDARD
Pending further enlightenment from the Supreme Court the quest for a federal
standard of legislative apportionment is being pursued primarily in a number of
federal and state court cases in several states. The only additional hint of possible
except as a possible basis for showing that some intelligible classification principle is being used. Id. at 325;
es seq. and 332.

"'1d. at 334.

His opinion on this question was supported by an Appendix entitled "The In-

adequacy of Arithmetical Formulas as Measures of the Rationality of Tennessee's Apportionment."
found a conscious choice of geography over people which is "rational" though perhaps unwise.
...Id. at 336.
"' Id. at 335- (Emphasis added.)
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Supreme Court views came a month after Baker v. Car. In a brief order the Court
remanded Scholle v. Hare2 51 which challenged Michigan's system of fixed
geographic representation in the state senate, to the state supreme court for reconsideration in the light of Baker v. Carr. There are differences, two unimportant
and two quite significant, between the facts of Baker and the facts of Scholle. Unlike the Tennessee situation, the Michigan apportionment was in conformity with
the state constitution, and had also been approved by popular referendum in 1952.
These two factors are unimportant because variant state practices and desires do not
control federal standards. At most a nationwide sentiment or practice might condition the Court's view of the outer boundaries of reasonableness.
One of the two significant distinctions is that the Michigan case involves only
the state senate, thus raising the question whether the federal constitution requires
approximate numerical equality of representation in both houses of a state legislature.
The other significant distinction is that the distribution of seats in the Michigan
senate may be on a rational basis-that is, according to an intelligible principle of
geographic representation, rather than on the unprincipled and capricious basis
which concerned Justice Clark in the Tennessee case. The decision to remand
Scholle v. Hare was correct, however, assuming the correctness of the explanation by
Justices Clark and Stewart that the Court did not know from the record whether
the Michigan court had decided the case on the merits of the constitutional claim, or
had dismissed under the Colegroue doctrine, now repudiated by Baker.
A. Idaho and Alabama
A scant few days after Baker v. Carr the Idaho Supreme Court refused to void
the current apportionment of the Idaho legislature, but threw little light on the
question of standards because the case had been handled primarily as a state
constitutional law case. 52 The fourteenth amendment was treated cursorily and
on this branch of the case the Idaho court took its guidance from Justice Stewart
who had stressed that the Court in Baker was settling nothing in regard to the
merits and had not repudiated the earlier dictum of the per curiam opinion in
258
MacDougall v. Green that:
. .. [the Equal Protection clause does not] deny a State the power to assure a proper
diffusion of political initiative as between its thinly populated counties and those having
concentrated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have practical opportunities for
exerting their political weight at the polls not available to the former.
251 369 U.S. 429 (1962). Justice Harlan would have dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Unlike the majority he felt the Michigan court already had reached the merits, and that to remand
now in the light of Baker v. Carr was misleading unless the majority in Baker meant much more than
they said. For later developments in Michigan, see text infra at note 273a.
25' Caesar v. Williams, 37, P.2d 241 (Idaho 5962). The effect was to perpetuate a system under
which 56% of the people had only 36% of the representatives and 18% of the senators.
...Id. at 249, as derived from MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948). Rehearing was
denied, May 8, 1962, despite plaintiff's vigorous assertion that the decision and opinion of the Idaho
Supreme Court had been an "abdication by the Majority" of their duty to render a decision under
the fourteenth amendment. Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent on Rehearing, p. 13.
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Additionally, there was a timeliness factor because the court noted that the Idaho
legislature had not had ample opportunity to examine fully the impact of the x96o
census on the state's apportionment.
In the Alabama case the three-judge federal district court on April 14, 1962,
assumed a population formula in voiding the existing apportionment and calling
for action by July 16, 1962, to avoid court-arranged reapportionment 2 " But the
Alabama Constitution specified a population formula-with, however, important
modifications ignored by the court2 -and the court did not say whether the federal
equal protection clause likewise would have required use of a population formula for
either or both houses. The court was bemused by the state's violation of its own
constitution and then, like Justice Clark in Baker, went on seemingly to adopt sub
silentio a federal population principle of undetermined dimensions. It warned
that if the legislature did not act, or did not meet the "constitutional standards"2'
which the court had not specified, the court would then reapportion before the
November 1962 election, taking its cue from Justice Clark's opinion in Baker.
It might "start with the existing assembly districts, consolidate some of them, and
award the seats thus released to those counties suffering the most egregious discrimination," thereby releasing "the strangle hold now on the Assembly and [permit] it to redistrict itself." '
The resultant special session of the Alabama legislature failed to produce an
acceptable reapportionment plan. In late July the court ordered into effect a makeshift reapportionment formula using parts of two different plans passed by the
legislature, and affecting both houses; and the state decided to accept the decree5 7"
The court warned that the legislature elected in November 1962 must go further
than the standby plan or risk further judicial intervention.
Significantly, the court indicated that population must be considered to some
extent in regard to the apportionment formula for each house of the legislature.
Alabama thus became the first state in which federal judges assumed the function
of participating directly in the policy choices regarding a particular reapportionment
plan, rather than merely approving or disapproving legislative handiwork.
B. Georgia and Michigan
The first explicit treatment of the standard problem came one month after Baker
v. Carr when a federal district court in Sanders v. Gray25 nullified Georgia's county
unit system of weighting votes for nomination for state office. The disparity between the weight of a vote in the most populous county (Fulton-556,226 population,
6 unit votes), and the weight of a vote in the least populous county (Echols-876
population, 2 unit votes), had been 99 to i, in terms of population. In other words,
VEEK 2512 (M.D. Ala.) (U.S. April 14, 1962).
See Chart III in Appendix regarding state constitutional provisions concerning apportionment.
Sims v. Frink, supra note 254.
" Ibid., quoting Justice Clark.
25" N.Y. Times, July 22, x962, p. i, col. 2; id. July 24, 1962, p. 15, cOl. 4; id. July 26, 1962, p. 24,
254

Sims v. Frink, 30 U.S.L.

col. 8.
2 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962), appeal docketed, No. 959, 370 U.S. 921 (1962).
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each of the "unit votes" in Fulton County represented 92,539 people; each of the
"unit votes" in Echols County represented 938 people59 Even as modified the
preceding day in a legislative special session, the "new system missed the mark
in two respects: first in failing to accord the unit of the plaintiff a reasonable
proportion of the whole, and second in failing to accord the units representing a
; 260
majority of the population a reasonable proportion of the whole.
The court recognized that "it may appear doctrinaire '"2 6 to attempt to reduce
equal protection to precise rules. Nevertheless it went -ahead and did so after
first reviewing a number of relevant factors, not all of which were obviously related
to the rule formulated. 262 In its final formulation the court flatly embraced numerical equality as a major premise, thus apparently ruling out use of geographic
or other weighting even if done on a principled, regularized basis. But then it
added the odd qualification that no population disparity would be "invidiously discriminatory" which did not exceed the disparity among states that exists in the
allocation of votes in the electoral college or seats in the House of Representatives.

The court said :263
[W]e ... hold that a unit system for use in a party primary is invidiously discriminatory
if any unit has less than its share to the nearest whole number proportionateto population,
or to the whole of the vote in a recent party gubernatorial primary, or to the whole vote
for electors of the party in a recent presidential election; provided no discrimination is
deemed to be invidious under the system if the disparity against any county is not in
excess of the disparity that exists against any state in the most recent electoral college
allocation, or under the equal proportions formula for representation of the several states
in the Congress, and provided that it is adjusted to accord with changes in the basis
at least once each ten years. This is a "judicially manageable standard" contemplated in
Baker v. Carr.
.The rule that no state may have fewer than one seat
in the House of Representatives, no matter how small its population, causes disparity by proportionately inflating the voice of the small state. But the more striking disparities occur in the
electoral college because of the rule that no state, no matter how small in population, may have fewer than three electoral votes--one for each of its two senators and
"' The court worked out a mere lo-i discrimination against Fulton County by relating the population
and unit votes of each of these two counties to the total of 410 county unit votes rather than by comparing the two counties in terms of voter status. It pointed out that Fulton with 14.I per cent of
the state's population had only 1.46 per cent of the total county unit votes, while Echols with 05 per
cent of the population had .48 per cent of the total units. Id. at i6o.
These different ratios, each computed by a rational process, indicate that at the very least Baker v.
Carr may have opened a new frontier of gamesmanship.
5 0
T Id. at 170. The last minute change by the legislature boosted Fulton County to 40 unit votes.
This means that each voter in Echols still had about fourteen times as much political weight as a voter in
Fulton.
: Id. at 170.
"'2'Factors mentioned included the "rationality of state policy," (derived from Justice Clark in Baker
v. Carr), whether the system was "arbitrary," "historical basis in our political institutions," "presence
or absence of political remedy," the factor of "delicate relationship between federal and state governments
under the Constitution." id. at 168-7o.
.. Id. at 17o. (Emphasis added.)
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one for its congressman. Electoral college disparities thus become the measure of
equal protection of unit votes under this decision.
The anomalous and unsatisfying character of this electoral college ratio test, if
generalized as a standard for application of the fourteenth amendment in this field,
becomes apparent as soon as it is subjected either to a practical or to an historical and
conceptual analysis. Practically, it would allow disparities as great as or greater than
those complained of in much of the recent litigation about congressional districts
or state legislative apportionment. The ratio also would vary with the chance factor
of differential growth rates as between the most populous and least populous states.
A permissible disparity of 5 to I would result from this standard at present because
in the smallest state, Alaska, each of the three presidential electors speaks for
75,389 of the total population of 226,167, while in the largest state, New York, each
of the forty-three presidential electors speaks for 390,286 of the total population of
I6,782,3o424
As applied to congressional districts, such a ratio would mean that citizens in a
district of i,oooooo population would have no constitutional ground for complaint
so long as the small district was not less than 200,000. But their prospects for
relief would be considerably improved if there were a population boom in the
smallest statel From a practical standpoint, therefore, the electoral college ratio
test suggested by the district court in Georgia is a yardstick made in Wonderland
for Alice.
The standard rests on no better ground when analyzed historically and conceptually. The electoral college apportionment, like the apportionment in the
Federal Congress of which it is a carbon copy, is a product of the great compromise
on representation on which our federal union is based. The familiar decision
at the constitutional convention to create a bicameral legislature, following the New
Jersey plan of equality of the states in one house and the Virginia plan of representation proportioned to population or wealth in the other house, was a necessary
structural compromise entered into by "sovereign" states. It was so vital and necessary that the principle of equal representation in the Senate was even exempted
from the power of constitutional amendment 6 5 The same apportionment system
2'

Based on x96o census figures and the reapportionment of the House of Representatives effective

in x962.
...U.S. CoNsr. art. V. Concurrently it may be noted that the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 specified
that the "inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled to the benefits . . . of a proportionate
representation of the people in the legislature . . ." without distinguishing between upper and lower
house.
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(Tansill ed. 1927). In the context of the time, the purpose was to devise a plan of government for a
sparsely settled territory, largely devoid of political tradition, of established and traditional local units,
of customary sectional sub-loyalties, and the multifarious other elements which complicate apportionment

in a long-established society. The Ordinance devised a representation system keyed to the one readily
identifiable element-an expanding population of settlers. The pertinent provisions, in addition to the
clause quoted above, were as follows: "So soon as there shall be five thousand free male inhabitants, of full
age, in the district, upon giving proof thereon to the governor, they shall receive authority, with time and
place, to elect reiresentatives from their counties or townships, to represent them in the general assembly:

Provided, That for every five hundred free male inhabitants there shall be one representative, and so on,
progressively, with the number of free male inhabitants, shall the right of representation increase, until
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was adopted for the electoral college in order to apply to the Presidency the same
weighting of the states that applied to the Congress. The disparities among the
states regarding the electoral college are thus a special case, in the purest sense of
the term.
In the light of these considerations it would appear doubtful that the Supreme
Court would endorse the district court's formulation of the standard when it reviews
Sanders v. Gray in the October Term 1962, whatever the outcome of the case itself.
In the meantime, there was no stay of the injunction the district court issued against
applying the unit system in determining the outcome of races for governor, senator,
and other state-wide offices in the September 1962 primary2 6
Sanders v. Gray is not to be confused with two other Georgia cases: one seeking
reapportionment of the state legislature, the other seeking revision of the congressional districts. In the former suit, Toombs v. Fortson,26 7 a federal district
court in May 1962 called for reapportionment of at least one house of the legislature
on a population basis by the January 1963 session, but deferred issuing an injunction
to give the state a "reasonable opportunity ...

to meet the constitutional standards

here laid down . . . ."s A month later, a federal district court dismissed the
congressional district suit, Wesberry v. Vandiver,69 on a mixture of grounds. It
doubted that Baker had reversed Colegrove in regard to congressional districts,
because of the factor of involvement of a coordinate branch of the government, and
it thought relief might be forthcoming from "a properly apportioned ' "a state legislature which was already in sight under the Toombs v. Fortson decision. Assuming
that "a properly reapportioned" legislature does eventuate, this approach to the
congressional districting case is eminently sound. The state legislature is the key
to congressional districting, unit vote weighting schemes, urban problems, and
regular reapportionment of the legislature itself.
In Toombs v. Fortson the court was presented with a record showing disparities
far in excess of the electoral college ratio test announced in the county unit case
a month earlier. Computations showed that io3 counties having six per cent of the
population could elect a majority of the lower house, and that eighty-four counties
having twenty-one per cent of the population could elect a majority of the upper
house. In holding the apportionment to be invidiously discriminatory, the court
nevertheless inferred that the electoral college ratio test should not be taken as quite
the absolute that it appeared to be in the county unit context in Sanders tr. Gray 7 0
The court said that a finding of invidious discrimination might be avoided if it
the number of representatives shall amount to twenty-five, after which the number and proportion of
representatives shall be regulated by the legislature...
Id. at 49.
..A petition for stay was denied by the district court, and not requested of the Supreme Court.
N.Y. Times, June 1g, 1962, p. 1, col. 2.
5
26' 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
Id. at 259.
Sao 31 U.S.L. Wanse 2017 (N.D. Ga.) (U.S. June 20, 1962).
2009 Ibid.
70
2 Toombs v. Fortson, supra note 267.
Without actually saying so, the court indicated that the
electoral college ratio test used in the county unit case was inapplicable to legislative appoitiontnent.
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could be shown that the disparities were pursuant to a rational state policy, but there
27
was no such showing here: '
No factual evidence has been presented to the Court upon which the Court can posit any
finding, as a finding of fact, that a state policy exists which justifies the great disparities in
legislative representation between the counties in which plaintiffs reside and the many
other counties of the states whose representative strength exceeds that of Fulton County
by as much as 98 to x. We are left then to speculate as to whether there may be some
rational policy, and we are forced to the conclusion that there is no policy but simply a
reluctance of those with grossly disproportionate power over the legislative process to
surrender such power.
It suggested, however, that a policy of having one house of a bicameral system on
a geographic basis and the other on a population basis would be a rational policy,
and only required Georgia to change one house by the January x963 legislative
session.
Thus, putting Sanders and Toombs together, two tentative rules appear. In
elections of state-wide office holders the population principle must be embraced, disparities in weighting of votes being permitted only up to the maximum ratio found
in the electoral college system of election of President and Vice President, which
as shown above is now about five to one. For apportionment of state legislatures,
where a factor of representation is present which is lacking in election of state-wide
office holders, bicameralism is permissible. And within bicameralism gross departure from the population principle by placing one house on a geographic basis
is permissible as long as the population principle is expressed in the lower house.
The rationality of such a policy is supported in part by analogy to the Federal
Congress, the court thought, despite a contrary dictum in Justice Douglas' dissent in
MacDougall v. Green17' and despite possible inferences from the Supreme Court's
remand of the Michigan state senate case 273 after Baker v. Carr.
The possible contrary inferences from Scholle v. Hare were reinforced by the
Michigan Supreme Court's 4-3 decision, after remand, invalidating the geographic
formula for the state senate2 73a It was viewed as being more a freezing of existing
districts than a provision for area representation according to a rational plan. Two
judges seemingly would go further and read into the fourteenth amendment the
mathematical formula developed earlier in Michigan constitutional law, i.e., that
permissible discretion is exceeded when an apportionment yields districts having more
than double the population of others.
The Michigan court enjoined the senate primary, which was less than three
weeks away, and said that the state senators would have to be elected at large in
November 1962 unless appropriate legislation were enacted by August 20. United
States Supreme Court Justice Stewart, however, stayed this drastic relief on the
273
that new issues were involved, not covered by Baker v. Carr. b
ground
11 1
27 d. at 254.
27335 U.S. 281, 289-90 (1948).
M Scholle v. Hare, supra note 251.
27'1Scholle v. Hare, 3 "U.S.L. WEEK 2059 (Sup. Ct. Mich.) (U.S. July x8,
273b 3 1 U.S.L. VEEK ioi8 (U.S. July 31, 1962).
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C. Maryland
As the first judicially impelled reapportionment after Baker v. Carr, the litigation
in Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes2 74 is of great moment to
the citizens of Maryland but throws little light on the question of the federal constitutional standard. In April, the court of appeals reversed a lower court dismissal
of a reapportionment suit. In May, the lower court held that the apportionment of
the lower house would violate the equal protection clause as applied to the 1962
November election,2 and the legislature in special session then enacted a stop-gap
bill. 70 In June, litigation was pursued in an attempt to have the lower court ruling
expanded to include the state senate.2 77
As in most of the cases gross population disparity in regard to both houses of the
legislature could be shown but neither court nor counsel developed a reasonably
precise, articulated theory of federal right. At the time of the hearing in the court
of appeals seventy-six per cent of the state's population, concentrated in Baltimore
City and four suburban counties, elected only thirty-four per cent of the state senate,
and forty-nine per cent of the lower house2 78 A vote in the least populous county
had almost thirteen times as much weight as a vote in the most populous county.
In remanding to the lower court for a decision on the merits the court of appeals
said :279
•..there is a strong implication in the Baker decision that there must be some reasonable
relationship of population, or eligible voters, to representation in the General Assembly,
if an apportionment is to escape the label of constitutionally-prohibited invidious discrimination.
But the court also spoke of the traditional geographic representation in the Maryland
Senate and said that a "greater latitude" regarding population might be permissible
'28 0
there, or "possibly some different basis of apportionment
The balance of the opinion was devoted largely to giving the lower court guidance on remedies, and here the court of appeals took a delightfully frank and creative approach. If the apportionment were held unconstitutional it should be in relation
to the November 1962 election, and without impact on the existing legislature. An
"at large" election should be avoided because not authorized in the state constitution
and, perhaps, because the court, sub silentio, did not think it appropriate. The court
could not call a special session but the governor could. If called into special session
the legislature would have power, because of the overriding force of the fourteenth
amendment, to itself modify the unconstitutional parts of the Maryland Constitution
regarding apportionment. It could raise or lower the total number of seats in either
house. Alternatively, and this was the most unusual suggestion, it could leave the
27 228 Md. 412, i8o A.2d 656 (1962).
2
' Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 30 U.S. L. ,VEEI 2587 (Cir. Ct.) (U.S. May 24, 1962).

,71Washington Post, June i, 1962, p. 1, col. 8.
'" 7Plaintiffs had sought a general ruling but the circuit judge had confined his decision to the
House of Delegates.
"8 Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 421, i8o A.2d 656, 66o (z962).
2
280 Ibid.
70Id.
at 434, 18o A.2d at 668.
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representation physically unchanged but provide for fractional voting by representatives to correct the proportionate disparities. Further, the legislature's action could
take the form of a stop-gap measure for 1962, coupled with a proposed constitutional
amendment, including provision for future reapportionment. The Maryland Court
of Appeals thus neatly sidestepped the supposed inability to justify a continued
status, de jure or de facto, for the legislature after a declaration of unconstitutionality
which had so troubled the Tennessee Supreme Court s" in the state case which was
a forerunner to Baker v. Carr.
All this was too much for the two dissenting justices. Forgetting that the mark
of the development of the common law in the King's Courts was that power preceded precedent, they unburdened themselves of a number of observations, including
the following:2 s2
It [the majority opinion] directs the chancellor, upon proof of the allegations of the bill,
to make a declaration striking down the provisions of one or more sections of the Constitution, but at the same time to defer the effectiveness of the declaration until after the
expiration of the terms of office of the present members. I cannot understand how that
can be done. But if it can, I cannot see how those members could enact legislation
reapportioning and reconstituting the General Assembly in the teeth of constitutional provisions that are still in force and effect.
The lower court, the governor, and the General Assembly got the several messages. Judge Duckett on remand voided the apportionment of the lower house and
issued the appropriate orders already outlined by the court of appeals. The standard
of unconstitutionality for the lower house was little more than a conclusionary statement that "invidious discrimination" existed because the "extent of the disparity"
The legislature in special session promptly
had no "reasonable justification." '
added nineteen seats to the lower house so that the districts containing seventy-six
per cent of the state's population obtained a fifty-five per cent majority in the lower
house s4 The plaintiffs then indicated they would make no further challenge of
the lower house until 1966 even though not fully satisfied with the reapportionment2

5

Judge Duckett's decision to defer a final decision on the constitutionality of the
senate-after intimating that he thought area was an appropriate basis for one
house-was reversed promptly in the court of appeals and sent back down for trial.
In pleading for a declaration of unconstitutionality of senate apportionment too, the
"'-Kidd v. McCanless, 2oo Tenn. 282, 292 S.W.2d 40 (956).
... Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 228 Md. 42, 445, i8o A.2d 656, 674 (1962).
5
2 'Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 30 U.S. L. WEFK 2587 (Cir. Ct.) (U.S. May 24, 1962). and
borrowed copy of full opinion.
" 'Washington Post, June x, x962, p. x, col. 8.
'8"Appellants [plaintiffs] believe that the so-called 'stop-gap' legislation enacted at the recent Special
Session of the Legislature, although belated, begrudgingly enacted, hardly equitable, much less generous,
nevertheless, at least as a temporary or transitional measure, cannot successfully be attacked by appellants
as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly the appellants have abandoned any
further present court challenge to the representation now provided in the House of Delegates, at least
" Appellants! Answer to Appellees' Motion to Dismiss Appeal, p. 3, Maryland Committee
until x966..
v. Tawes, Court of Appeals, No. 94, filed June 5, 1962.
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plaintiffs articulated no detailed theory of a federal right. Rather they rested on the
assertion that "if it is unconstitutional for twenty-four per cent of the population to
have fifty-one per cent of voting control in one house of the legislature, a fortiori,
it is unconstitutional for the same twenty-four per cent to enjoy sixty-six per cent
representation in the other house of that legislature. 2"
However, Judge Duckett denied relief, holding that apportionment of the senate
by area does not violate the fourteenth amendment so long as the lower house is
fairly apportioned according to population 2 sI a and the court of appeals promptly
affirmed in a 4-3 decision'Sb
D. Tennessee
In the home state of Baker v. Carr, a legislative special session in June 1962
brought forth a mouse, but one entitled to live for one year according to a federal
district court ruling two weeks later.287 In criticizing the reapportionment the
court indicated two standards: first, that at least one house should be based on numercial equality of voters; second, that the other house, the senate, should at least be
based on a rational plan.
E. Other Actions
In several other states either state or federal district courts have acted to void
apportionments and impel special sessions of legislatures under judicial threat to
assume the reapportionment function, e.g., Oklahoma,2 8s Wisconsin, 8 9 Mississippi, 2 90
and Vermont.2 9 ' And the list steadily grows of states in which some action has
either been taken or is pending, so that almost half of the states were involved as of
?
June 1962 92
288 Petitioners' Brief on the Merits

or, Alternatively, In Support of Their Motion for Summary

Judgment, p. 28, Maryland Committee v. Tawes, Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Eq. No.
13,920, filed May 28, 1962.
2.. Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 31 U.S. L. WEEKs 2016 (Cir. Ct. Md.) (U.S. June 28, 1962).
Post, July 24, 1962, p. 1, col. 4.
Baker v. Carr, 31 U.S. L. WEEKc 2003 (D. Tenn.) (U.S. June 22, 1962).

28Gb Washington
287

See also N.Y. Times, June

Washington Post, June 23, x962, p. 5, col. i. If the legislature takes no
further action the case may be reopened by June 3, 1963.
25 Washington Post, June 20, 1962, p. 7, CoL. 4 (federal district court declared apportionment invalid,
deferred relief to give legislature opportunity to act). It may be noted that the district court order in
Oklahoma was to a legislature of a state whose governor could be expected to add the weight of his
authority, and all resources at his command, to the enforcement of the court's order. Governor Edmondson had been elected on a reapportionment platform, had already unsuccessfully tried to browbeat the
legislature into reapportioning the state, and had offered an amicus curiae brief in Baker v.Cart pleading
with the Court to act.
280N.Y. Times, June 9, x962, P. 22, col. I (federal district court gave Governor, io days to call special
session and warned it would appoint a master to reapportion if legislature dragged its feet). In the
special session the Democratic governor vetoed three reapportionment plans of the Republican-controlled
legislature. The court did appoint a special master, but as of late July he had recommended that the
three-judge federal district court dismiss the suit on the ground that the present districts did not deny
voters any constitutional rights. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1962, p. 24, col. 8.
20 Washington Post, June 8, 1962, p. 4, co. 3 *(lower state court voided legislative apportionment,
asked for special session of legislature, said it would act itself if necessary).
...N.Y. Times, May 14, 1962, p. 1, col.' (lower 'state court found state senate districts invalid and
enjoined two counties from holding elections). The state supreme court affirmed and a special session of the
23, 1962, p. 23, col. i;

legislature resulted, Washington Post, July 22, 1962, p. 5, col. s.
2

. n addition to occasional compilations in the press [e.g. N.Y. Times,'May

24, 296!,

p. r, col. 2;
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22
Perhaps the most interesting of the handful of qualified negative responses a of
the. courts is Levitt v. Maynard 29 b in which the New Hampshire Supreme Court
refused to disturb that state's unique apportionment formula for the upper house
of the legislature. The ,formula is keyed neither to area nor to population in the
simple sense, but rather to the proportion of direct taxes paid by the districts. The
court noted that the equalized valuations of the current districts varied within a
relatively narrow range, from a high of $122,000,000 to a low of $96,000,000 (the
ideal average being $1o9,oooooo). In terms of population the figures ranged from

41,457 in the most populous district to 16,829 in the least populous district. The

court was especially impressed by the fact that the minimum per cent of the 196o
population necessary to elect a majority of the senate was 45.3 per cent, a percentage
that compared favorably with systems in other states.
The court concluded that it could not say that New Hampshire's system was
"without rational basis or that it has produced an unrepresentative selection in the
upper house of the Legislature. ' '292c The New Hampshire case poses in sharp
perspective the crucial question which will dominate current and future litigationthat is, the extent to which the fourteenth amendment requires explicit recognition
of population in the apportionment formulae for either or both houses of a legislature.
F. Local Legislative Councils
Equal protection, of course, does not stop at the state level. A recent Ohio
Supreme Court order to the Cleveland City Council to redistrict the city is explicable as simply an order to comply with a reapportionment duty under the city
charter,29 3 but undoubtedly is a harbinger of a still further outreach of Baker v. Carr.
VI
EVALUATION OF THE STANDARD-REMEDY

PROBLEM

The experience regarding litigation started both in federal and in state courts in
the firsit three months after Baker v. Carr has borne out the spirit if not the letter
of Justice Douglas' robust optimism in his concurring opinion that "any relief
2 4
accorded can be fashioned in the light of the well-known principles of equity."
Washington Post, June 24, 1962, p. E3, col. i] a monthly review of reapportionment appears in the
National Civic Review. Other cases of broad interest include the Supreme Court remand to the federal
district court to take a fresh look at the New York legislature, W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 202 F. Supp.
741 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), vacated and remanded, 370 U.S. 190 (1962); the Indiana cases (a lower court

state judge voided the legislative apportionment before Baker v. Carr, and suit was also filed in federal
district court).
9

Sweeney v. Notte, 31 U.S. L. WEas

2o6o (Sup. Ct. R.I.)

(U.S. July 24, 1962), in which the

court intimated that Rhode Island's apportionment formulae were unconstitutional, and that a federal
court might order reapportionment, but said it was barred by the state separation of powers doctrine
from taking action; Stein v. General Assembly, 31 U.S. L. WEE 2075 (Sup. Ct. Colo.) (U.S. July 6,
5962), in which the court delayed action because neither popular initiative nor legislative redress
had been exhausted.
292b 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2060 (Sup. Ct. N.H.) (US. July x6, x962).
2 id. at 2o61.
Washington Post, June 21, x962, p. 8, col. 2.
...Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. A86, 250 (r962).
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A fair amount of judicial explication has been needed, as in Maryland, but it has
been forthcoming and has been heeded. And with the Little Rock example of

executive support of judicial action a recent memory,29 5 a calculus of horribles is not
to be indulged. Further, the courts have so far been able to induce some legislative
action, or hypothesize action they might themselves take along the lines of Justice
Clark's concurring opinion, without contemplating use of the highly questionable
device of at large election for a state legislature.
The critical question of the federal standard of fair representation, however, has
been only faintly illuminated. Some of the post-Baker cases are better judged on
their facts than on their opinions. When it could be shown that districts containing
a majority of the population of the state-typically urban and suburban districtsdid not have majority control of either house of the legislature, the courts generally
have acted. 9 6 On such a record it would seem that the proper constitutional ground
is due process-it being unreasonable and arbitrary to underrepresent so grossly such
a vital democratic component as people.
It may still be essentially a due process issue when the next level of difficulty is
reached. The next level involves the question whether giving majority control
of one house to districts where a majority of the population resides is still insufficient where (i)the other house remains in the hands of a rural minority,
and/or (2) where the majority control in the one house is still grossly disproportionate to the numerical strength of the urban-suburban majority. For example,
in Maryland, reapportionment raised the districts containing seventy-six per cent
of the people to majority control of the lower house-but only to a fifty-five per cent
majority.
The due process clause would seem to be less appropriate than the equal protection clause--if indeed, either clause is appropriate-when further refinements are
considered. Some possible refinements that readily come to mind include: (i)
whether the Constitution is violated when majority control is denied to districts
where a majority, but not an overwhelming majority, of the people reside, e.g., when
disparity drops from Maryland's prereapportionment figure of seventy-six per cent to
seventy, sixty-five, sixty, fifty-five, or fifty-three per cent; (2) whether any particular
district can ever be allowed to be more than two, three, four, five times as populous
as another district with the same representation; (3) as a refinement of the previous
point, whether to facilitate district-to-district comparisons under an equal protection
approach a constitutional rule should be formulated that no district would be constitutional if it deviated by more than a certain percentage from the "average population" obtained by dividing the total population by the total number of districts.
The last-named rule relates to statutory limits which it has been suggested from
time to time Congress should impose on state legislatures in regard to congressional
9
districts.? T
...Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).

98 An early exception was Idaho, text supra at notes 252, 253-

...See text and note at note 141 supra.
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Running through all of these. possibilities will be the question of the extent to
which the meaning of "equality" will vary as the challenged institutional arrangement
shifts from unit voting .ystems to congressional districts, to state legislatures, and
within state legislatures from the lower house to the state senate. These institutional
arrangements have been listed intentionally in what would appear to be a descending
order regarding the mandatory force of the one-man-one-vote principle. First, there
can be almost no excuse for a unit vote system because the purpose is to elect a single
officil eg., governor or United States Senator, who in his single person is viewed as
representing, and being.responsible to, all of the people. To be sure, the President is
elected under a weighted electoral college system rather than on a straight population
basis, but this is a product of the initial federal compromise of 1787. Second, as
soon as one turns from unit voting to congressional districting, a qualification of uncertain weight enters. The congressional delegation represents the people of the
state in the House of Representatives, the states themselves being weighted by
population in the congressional apportionment. These facts evoke the one-man-onevote principle. But it is immediately qualified by the additional fact that the expectation and actual tradition has been that congressmen, through allocation to districts,
would perform also a representative function within the state, thus enriching the
variety of views brought to the national assembly. In representative theory there
are many shades and fashions of majoritarianism, produced by differing combinations
of assembly size, apportionments, districting and franchise.
Third, when one turns from congressional districts-which are a component of
only half of the national legislature-to state legislatures the representative theory becomes much more complicated. Conceding that only a massed "Aye" is needed for
the selection of the governor, what variety of expression should be built into the
basic structure of the legislature, and what dominance should be accorded to those
who in numbers, and probably in wealth, comprise the largest segment of the state?
And what of checks and balances and bicameralism? Extracting a rule that at least
one house should be dominated by numbers, do different considerations enter when
one turns to the other house of the legislature?
In the ultimate configuration of this litigation Justice Frankfurter was undoubtedly correct when he said that plaintiffs ask the Court to be willing to make
a choice "among competing theories of political philosophy," to make "an inquiry
into the theoretic base of representation in an acceptably republican state." 2 8 But,
one may ask, difficult though the articulation may be, what is wrong with a Court
commitment to a "democratic political philosophy?" The absence of enlightenment from past precedents, ,and the fact that past and present actual practices are
based more on an inequality principle than an equality principle in representation,
do pose difficulties.
However, the deviation between theory and practice, aspiration and accomplishment, is not unfamiliar to constitutional law and explains both the fascination and the
"z'Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. z86, 300, 301 (0962).
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heated disputes of the subject. Analogous deviations prevailed in regard to race,
prior to the Desegregation Decision, 299 and in regard to state search and seizure
practices and the exclusionary rule prior to Mapp v. Ohio.300 If a long standing
contrary practice is to be taken as rendering inappropriate a new judicial rule designed
to implement for the first time an immanent constitutional ideal then a number of
leading decisions are questionable.
One of the most clouded, but also most precious, attributes of judicial review is
the role of the Court as the "keeper of the Nation's conscience," exercising through
judicial review a responsibility as well as a power to achieve a higher public morality.
Political realities being what they are, it is doubtful if either the Desegregation
Decision or the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio could have been initiated in
Congress and ratified by three-fourths of the states as constitutional amendments.
By the same token, once created by judicial review, neither rule has been undone by
constitutional amendment.
The difficulties inherent in apportionment and districting litigation are subject
to two limiting factors. First, as already seen, the Court may have to become specific
on merits and remedies in relatively few cases. Second, the Court can choose, and
probably should choose, to adopt as its standard not a principle of promoting
equality-with all the logical and practical difficulties that would arise in defining
what is "fair"-but rather a principle of negating proven instances of egregiously
unreasonable apportionment patterns. The process of case by case identification of
"unfairness," on full records but narrowly focused, is the traditional stuff of judicial
review
In short, in apportionment cases and in the associational privacy cases the true
constitutional principle may not be the one asserted at all-equal protection and
first amendment, respectively. The true principle may be due process, checking
unreasonableness not under an absolute standard of free speech, or equality, but
under a factually illuminated "balancing" formula. 0 ' Without reaching Justice
Frankfurter's question of "the theoretic base of representation in an acceptably
republican state," the Court could hold, on an appropriate factual base, that a representation. system under which a major group of complainants is excluded from
effective voice in either house is unreasonable because minority process is not due
process. It could, and probably should, eschew detailed district by district comparisons under numerical rules of thumb, just as it has avoided detailed rules in yet
another highly discretionary, but nationally necessary field-he application of the
commerce clause to state regulation and taxation. And by this approach the Court
would avoid also the difficult and probably fruitless quest for a showing of "purposeful or intentional"-rather than presumed-discriminations which the Snowden
precedent802 may require in regard to equal protection.
2"' Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483

(1952).

o0 367 U.S. 643 (196i).
0 Cf. Nutting, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 30 GEo.
""2Snowden v. Hughes, 32X U.S. I (1944)-

WVASH.L.

REV. 167 (1961).
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CONCLUSION

Baker v. Carr rests on a principle of judicial necessity to act to preserve the very
essence of the democratic process. Its novelty is not to be minimized by distortion of
earlier and generally negative precedents. It was, and remains, a very large step
in the direction of close judicial scrutiny of the politics of the people. As "an
eminently realistic body of men, ' 30 3 it is difficult to suppose that the Court was uninfluenced by the fact of exhaustion of non-judicial modes of relief over a period of
several decades.
For the urban majority the decision may well evoke memory of the famous lines
of the Declaration of Independence that prudence "will dictate that Governments
long established should not be changed for light and transient causes," but that
a duty to act arises from "a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably
the same Object.... ." The Declaration led to a new political order. The degree
and character of political power shift destined to flow from Baker V. Carr remains
to be seen. Much will depend on the still unresolved question of the federal standard
of fair apportionment, whether ultimately phrased in the broad terms of due
process or "republican form of government," or based on the tighter conception of
equal protection. In some states numbers will equate closely with education, wealth,
and culture; in others there may be no correlation or an inverse correlation 3 0'
The most striking aspect of Baker v. Carr,viewed only a few months after the
decision, is the rapidity with which old suits have been concluded in judicial orders
for change-without need to experiment with new sanctions-and new suits instituted. If this seems surprising it may be because the present is too much with us
and we are too prone to equate Baker v. Carr with the bitter and tedious aftermath
of Brown v. Board of Education, forgetting the uniqueness of racial tension against
a background of de jure slavery and a foreground of de facto serfdom. But De
Tocqueville would understand the decision, because to him the thrust for equality
was both the mark of American history and the touchstone of modern history.
His words are as appropriate now at the close as they were at the beginning.
Writing in 1835, he saw the development of "equality of conditions" as part of the
sweep of history over a seven hundred year period: universal and durable, the development "eludes all human interference, and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress." 305 Democratic communities have "a natural taste for freedom. ... they will seek it, cherish it, and view any privation with regret. But for
equality, their passion is ardent, insatiable, incessant, invincible."308
8

BERNARD TAPER, GommLuON vERsus LiGHTPOOT: T-E Tusx Er GERR~mANERm
CA
81 (1962).
"" Baker v. Carr provides an interesting contrapuntal theme for the efforts to broaden the Southern

"

Negro electorate through self-help and Department of Justice enforcement of the x957 and 196o Civil
Rights Acts. See Lomax, The Kennedys Move in on Dixie, Harper's Magazine, May 1962, p. 27.
8
'DE TOCQuEVrLLE, DzmocaRcy IN Armue.A 6, 7 (Commager ed. 1947).
30 id. at 310.
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CHART II
APPORTIONMENT FORMULAE OF STATE LEGISLATuREs-THtRTEFN ORIGINAL STATES

As OF I865-7o
Basis of Representation
LiRepresentation Based on Geographic Unit Without Regard To Population:
(a) Fqual Representation for each county.
(b) Equal Representation Based an Geographic Units
other than counties.

Delaware
New Jersey

Georgia
llassachusetts
New York
Rhode Island

Delaware

(I)

Connecticut

(I)

(2)

(4)
(0)

Maryland
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Virginia

(4)

I. Representation Proportioned To Units (county or district) On Basis Of Population but with MAJOR limitations to achieve geographic diffusion which may substantially defeat population principle: ag., (I) Minimum
limits, e.g.,rule that no unit may have lu than one representative, and, or, limitation on number of units which
may be combined to approximate one quota; (2) Magimum limits, e.g., rule that no unit may have more than a
designated number of representatives; and (3) Low limit
(in relation to number of counties) on maximum size of
legislature when combined with minimum diffusion
rules.-

Connecticut

(1)

IV. Representation To Be Apportioned On Population Basis
With Apparently MINOR Limitations. ba

New Hampahiro

(1)

V. Population.-

North Carolina

(1)

ILI'Representation Based On Geographic Unit With MINOR
Modifications Based On Population.a

Lower House

Upper House (Senate)

Georgin
Maryland
New Hampshiro
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Virginia

(10)

Massachusetts

(i)
(0)

constitutional formulae. The distinction
= Some states may be classified to either II or IT depending on the weight given to speci
mar not be vital however, because the primary thrust of both II and III is toward geographic diffusion. not representation by population.
but
weighted
more to population principle than to
not
easily
classifiable
category
have
special
formulae
Some states charted in this
geographic diffusion. The heavier line between categories IIl and IV is designed to separate states using a strong geographic diffusion
factor from states using a relatively unqualified population factor.
Despite constitutional provisions apporently speifying apportionment by population, allelates in categories IV and V have population
disparities between largest and smallest district at least exceeding 25%, and in mest eases far exceeding that figure.
OnuaNic LAWSor Ti
CnHAoEr.s ANDOTHER
Sourcm: BEoAwss P. PonE, THE FDE A, ANDSTArE CoNsTerolioos, COLONIAL
CHARTERs, ANDornEnOnnareso LAwn
STATE
CosITTrrIo , COLONIAL
UNITED STATs (1878); FFAocs N. THOaPE, THE FEocnAs AND
or Aa rnnCA (1900).
OFTHESTATES,
TErTrooRes, ANDCOLoIsES NOW ORHERETOFORE FoRmiNG THEUoeTeo STATES
Conment.: States other than the original thirteen were examined for the 1865-70 period but many wore not chartabls for a number of
reasons, e.g., lack of explicitness in formal constitutional provisions coupled with lack of information on actual implementation, frequent
constitutional change; instability in the South during Reconstruction. There was little evidence of a widespread embracing of a simple
population principle; there was emphasis on geographic diffusion.

LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONME NT

CHART III
APPORTIONMENT

FoiuL-AE

OF STATE LEGISLATUES AS O1 JULY I,

Basis of Representation

Upper House (Senate)

Lower House

L Representation Based On Geographic Unit Without Regard To Population:
(a) Equal Representation For Each County.

Arizona
Idaho
Montana
Nevada

New Jersey
New Mexico
South Carolina
(7)

(b) EqualRepresentationBased On GeographicUnits
Other Than Counties (including districts initially
devised according to population but fixed in constitution, e.g., Ark., N. D., Okla.)

Arkansas
Delaware
Illinois
Michigan

North Dakota
Oklahoma
(6)

Hawaii
Maryland
Mississippi

Ohio
(4)

II. lepresentation Based on Geographic Unit With MINOR
Modifications Based On Population.a

1961

Delaware
Vermont

(0)

(2)

(0)

III. Representation Proportioned To Units (county or district) On Basis Of Population but with MAJOR limitations to achieve
geographic diffusion which may substantinily defeat population principle: e.g., (I) Minimum
limits, g., rule that no unit may have les than one representative, and, or, limitation on number of units which
may be combined to approximate one quota; (2) Maximum limits, e.g., rule that no unit may have more than a
designated number of representatives; and (3) Low limit
(in relation to number of counties) on maximum size
of
legislature when combined with minimum diffusion rulea

Alabama
Vermont
California
Wyoming
Connecticut
(13)
Florida
Georgia
Iowa
Louisiana
Maine
Rhode Island
Texas
Utah (Low quota for 1st reprosentative; much higher for
additional representative.)

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Kansa
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Mimissippi
Misouri

IV. Representation To Be Apportioned On Population Basis
,
With Apparently MINOR Limitations.b o

Alaska
Misouri
New Hampshire
New York

Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
(7)

Alaska
Oregon
New Hampshire South Dakota
(Tax hasis;appears (4)
to avoid gross
inequity.)

V. Population.-

Colorado
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Massachusetts
Minnesota
North Carolina

NEBRASKA
Tennessee
Colorado
Virginia
Illinois
Washington
Indiana
West Virginia
Kentucky
Wisconsin
Massachusetts
(13)
Michigan
Minnesota

Montana
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Texas
Utah
West Virginia
Wyoming (32)

Tennessee
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin
(12)

Some states may he clasified
to either Ifor III, depending on the weight given to special
constitutional formulae. The distinction
may not be vital
however, because the primary thrust of both Ii and IIIis toward geographic diffusion, not representation by population.
Sorce states charted in this category have special formulae not easily classifiable but weighted more to population principle than to
geographic diffusion. The heavier line between categories III
and IV is designed to separate states using a strong geographic diffusion
factor
from states using a relatively unqualified population factor.
* Despite constitutional provisions apparently specifying apportionment by population, all states in categories IV and V have population
disparities between largest and smallest district at least exceeding 25%, and in most cases far exceeding that figure.
Souret: State Costitutions; NATIONAL
MusCePAL LEAGUE,
CoMPENmM oN LEoioss.avn APPogrIoNMEr (1962); aug BoOK OF
Ta STATES (1962-63); GORDON E. BAKER, STATE:
Cosa'rruTIoNs: REAPPORTIONMEN' (1960).
Comrment: The state constitutions themselves and the National Municipal League's Compendium are the best sources. The simple
.,population" classifications sometimes found in other tabulations are sanog because the qualifications on the basis of representation
noted under I (b) and Mi in this chart are often ignored.
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CHART IV
REGIONAL COMPARISONS OF REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES
HousE

o

REPRESENTATIvES

Predominant Characteristic
of Population

Number of
Districts in
Group

Urban ..................
Suburban ................
Rural ...................

126
60
250

54,427,014
32,902,170
91,230,035

431,960
548,370
364,920

National Total (excludes
District of Columbia)..

436*

178,559,219

408,602

Total Population
of Districts
in Group

Average
District
Population

Relative Values
of the Vote
(100=averago)

THE UNITED STATES

EASTERN STATES

(Conn., Del., Maine, Md., Mass., N. H., N. J., N. Y., Pa., R. I., Vt., W. Va.)
Urban ................
46
16,471,438
358,075
Suburban .............
....
33
15,885,354
481,374
Rural ...................
49
17,728,429
361,805
Regional Total ...........

I

128

j

50,085,221

1

391,291

1

SOUTMHEN STATES
(Ala., Ark., la., Ga., Ky., La., Miss., N. C., Okla., S. C., Tenn., Texas, Va.)
Urban .................1
24
13,367,384
556,974
Suburban ................
9
2,995,411
599,082
Rural ...................
91
32,438,960
356,472

Regional Total ...........

120

48,801,755

I

406,681

MIDWESTERN STATES

(111., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Mich., Minn., Mo., Neb., N. D., Ohio, S. D., Wis.)
Urban ...................
36
15,329,068
425,807
Suburban ................
12
7,285,536
607,128
Rural...................
81
29,004,535
358,081
Regional Total ...........

129

51,619,139

94
66
112

400,148

WESTERN STATES

(Alaska, Ariz., Calif., Colo., Hawaii, Idaho, Mont., Nev., N. M., Ore., Utah, Wash., Wyo.)
Urban .................
20
9,259,124
462,956
103
Suburban ...............
10
6,735,869
673,587
71
Rural...................
29
12,058,111
415,797
114
Regional Total ..........

59

28,053,104

475,476

*Actual House membership is currently 437. The "unclassifiable" At-Large ceat from Connecticut is excluded from these counts.
Source: Reproduced with permision from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Feb. 2, 1962, p. 153.
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CHART V
VALUE OF CITIZENS' VOTES FOR THE STATE LEGISLATURES,

I00 Categories of Counties by

Population Size

Under

25,000 ...

25,000- 99,999

....

100,000-499,999 .........
500,000 and over .........

I910-i960

Average Vote Value

INumber
of Counties
I in Category

Total Population of % of National
Counties in Category
Population Vote Value

1,942

1960
1
23,064,000

12.9

171

884

41,247,000

23.1

123

238
64

48,542,000
65,705,000

27.2
36.8

81
76

24,261,000
40,757,000
40,088,000
44,789,000

16.2
27.2
26.7
29.9

141
114
83
78

I

1950
Under 25,000 .........
25,000- 99,999 .........
100,000-499,999 .........
500,000 and over .........

1,954
901
200
41

I
1930

2,062

26,331,000

21.5

131

25,000- 99,999 .........
100,000-499,999 .........
500,000 and over .........

869
142
23

37,411,000
29,911,000
28,634,000

30.6
24.5
23.4

109
84
74

Under 25,000 ........
25,000- 99,999 .........
100,000-499,999 .........
500,000 and over .........

2,149
796
87
15

27,421,000
32,203,000
17,154,000
14,853,000

29.9
35.1
18.7
16.2

113
103
91
81

Under

25,000 .....

1910

P

Surce: Reproduced with permision from Congresional Quarterly Weekly Report, Feb. 2,1962, p. 170, as adapted from statistic in
V. DAV= &RALPH
Ers ,zeROa,
DEvALuATioN or TumURBAN
ANDSuBURAN Von (1961).

